#### **VENTURA COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION**

#### **AGENDA**

#### **BOARD OF RETIREMENT INVESTMENT RETREAT**

Thursday, September 26, 2013

#### Ventura Beach Marriott

2055 East Harbor Boulevard, Ventura, California 93001

8:30 a.m. Continental Morning Breakfast

9:00 a.m. Introductions, Administrative Matters, and Review of Agenda

Bill Wilson (Chair), Tracy Towner (Vice Chair) and Donald Kendig (Retirement

Administrator)

9:10 a.m. Infrastructure/Natural Resources/Water

Kleinwort Benson Investors (leading firm in environment strategies) and Macquarie Group (industry's largest infrastructure and real asset manager) are featured in a panel discussion

on the environment and investment opportunities

10:45 a.m. Break

11:00 a.m. The "Opportunistic Bucket"

Hewitt EnnisKnupp's alternatives expert will discuss the notion of implementing a separate policy allocation that enables temporary investments due to market dislocations and other

transient opportunities

12:00 Noon Working Lunch – Economy, Interest Rates, and Capital Markets

PIMCO and GMO, two firms that are often outspoken for their market forecasts, will debate

their views on the economy and investments

1:30 p.m. Research on the Traditional Stock/Bond Investing

Hewitt EnnisKnupp's head of research will review notable recent research on investing in

the traditional asset classes and strategies for success

2:30 p.m. *Break* 

2:45 p.m. VCERA – General Interest Topics

Donald Stracke will review a number of general interest topics, including a look at selected pages from the Greenwich and NCPERS 2012 public fund studies, how NEPC makes its asset class return and risk assumptions, general comparison of VCERA vs. other California

public funds, and some initial thoughts on starting the relationship and the existing

investment structure.

4:15 p.m. **Board Member Comments and Ideas for the Future** 

Board commentary on the day's discussions, potential modifications to the investment information provided during future Board meetings, and determination on next steps of

implementation

5:00 p.m. Reception

6:00 p.m. Dinner

#### **CONSULTANTS**

#### John Lee

#### **Hewitt EnnisKnupp**

#### john.j.lee@aonhewitt.com

John J. Lee is a Partner and a lead investment consultant at Hewitt EnnisKnupp. He is the head of the firm's U.S. West regional consulting team and is located in the Newport Beach, California office. John is responsible for all aspects of investment consulting services, including investment manager analysis and monitoring, performance evaluation, asset allocation, investment manager searches, and investment policy development.

John has more than 19 years of investment consulting experience, and more than 21 years of experience in the investment industry. John's previous roles at the firm include leader of the firm's regional Client Advisory Group (in Chicago). He has also managed the Trust Services and Asset Transitions group. John has served on the firm's Advisory Councils for global equity and defined contribution research. He was group leader of the firm's international equity, custody services, and defined contribution services research teams.

Prior to joining the firm in early 1994, John worked at Motorola Corporation and First Investors Corporation. John has an A.B. degree in Economics from the University of Chicago and an M.B.A. degree from Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University.

#### **Kevin Chen**

#### **Hewitt EnnisKnupp**

#### kevin.chen@aonhewitt.com

Kevin Chen is a Senior Investment Consultant based in our Los Angeles office. His primary responsibilities include client service, investment manager analysis, performance evaluation, investment policy development, and asset allocation research.

Kevin has over 10 years of experience in the investment industry. Before joining Hewitt EnnisKnupp, he worked for an investment manager conducting equity research within the health care and consumer staples sectors on a global basis. Most recently, Kevin helped develop and implement several endowments for the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians.

Kevin holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration/Finance from California State University, Northridge (CSUN). He is a CFA Level II candidate.

#### **SPEAKERS**

#### Steve Falci, CFA BS, MBA, MA

#### **Kleinwort Benson Investors**

#### Head of Strategy Development - Sustainable Investment

Steven Falci oversees the development of Kleinwort Benson Investors sustainable investment products and strategic priorities. He joined the firm in 2008 in the newly created position of Vice President – Sustainable Investment. He is a senior investment professional with over 20 years of broad experience overseeing investment teams and managing assets at a large pension fund, an institutional asset manager and a mutual fund company. Prior to joining the firm, Steve was CIO, Equities with the Calvert Group, where he oversaw the equity and asset allocation portfolios for the largest family of socially responsible mutual funds in the US. Before joining the Calvert Group, Steve was Senior Vice President, Senior Portfolio Manager and Principal at Mellon Equity Associates. Steve has a BS and MBA from the Stern School of

Business at New York University, an MA from Pittsburgh Theological Seminary and is a CFA charterholder.

#### **Graeme Conway**

#### **Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets**

#### graeme.conway@macquarie.com

Graeme Conway is a Senior Managing Director within Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets (MIRA) North America. Graeme leads the deal sourcing and execution of acquisitions for MIRA . He also sits on the MIRA (Americas) Executive Committee.

Graeme has over 15 years experience in infrastructure and has worked in markets around the world including Australia, Europe and North America. Graeme has led numerous transactions across the water, energy, storage and renewable energy sectors.

Graeme began his career with Macquarie in 1997 and has worked in advisory, project finance, structured finance and infrastructure funds management. In 2001, Graeme moved to the U.K., where he was instrumental in the establishment of Macquarie's first European infrastructure fund, MEIF1. Graeme subsequently established Macquarie Capital Advisory's European Utilities and Energy team and thereafter became Head of Macquarie Capital Europe. Graeme moved to MIRA's New York offices in 2012.

Graeme has a Bachelor of Engineering with First Class Honors and a Bachelor of Commerce in Finance and Management from University of Western Australia.

#### **SPEAKERS**

#### **Peter Hill**

#### **Hewitt EnnisKnupp**

#### peter.hill@aonhewitt.com

Peter Hill, Partner, is the global head of Hewitt EnnisKnupp's Liquid Alternatives research team. Peter's team, which is part of the larger Global Investment Management team, monitors and evaluates hedge funds, commodities managers, and other opportunistic strategies. Peter has assisted public and private fund fiduciaries select and monitor absolute return investments that meet their specific risk tolerances and investment objectives. Peter serves on Hewitt EnnisKnupp's U.S. Investment Committee, the group tasked with vetting the firm's overarching investment beliefs. The U.S. Investment Committee also approves all research positions and papers developed by the firm, and monitors consultants' adherence to the firm's stated investment policy beliefs in the advice they provide to clients. Peter was instrumental in developing the firm's robust operational due diligence procedures that are applied within our manager evaluation process.

Peter assists fiduciaries of public and corporate pension funds implement absolute return strategies that are consistent with the return and risk objectives of their funds, and conducts due diligence on a large universe of hedge fund managers, including those with multi-strategy, event driven, relative value, and directional approaches. He oversees a team of 13 investment professionals in the execution of the firm's due diligence processes for liquid alternatives. In addition, he educates trustees of public funds on the unique merits and challenges of investing in hedge funds and opportunistic strategies.

Peter spent 19 years at Insight Investment latterly as Head of International Equities. In this role Peter was responsible for a team of 12 portfolio managers, running assets in excess of £3 billion invested across a range of global equity markets. Peter spent eight years at Norwich Union Insurance Group, including marketing their pooled pension fund product to pension plan trustees.

Peter has a degree in Mathematics and Statistics from Reading University. He attended the London Business School Investment (Derivatives) program in 1991, and attained the CII/Personal Finance Society's Advanced Financial Planning Certificate in 2005.

#### **Josh Thimons**

#### **PIMCO**

#### josh.thimons@pimco.com

Josh Thimons is a managing director and portfolio manager n the Newport Beach office, focusing on interest rate derivatives. Prior to joining PIMCO in 2010, he was a managing director for the Royal Bank of Scotland, where he managed an interest rate proprietary trading group in Chicago. Previously, he was a senior vice president in portfolio management for Citadel Investment Group, focusing on interest rate and volatility trading. Prior to this, he was a director for Merrill Lynch Capital Services, managing an over-the-counter interest rate options market making desk. He has 14 years of investment experience and holds an undergraduate degree and an MBA from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

#### **SPEAKERS**

#### **Edmund Bellord**

**GMO** 

#### edmund.bellord@gmo.com

Edmund Bellord is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2008, he was a senior portfolio manager at State Street Global Advisors Capital Management. Previously, he worked at Mellon Capital Management as a strategist. Mr. Bellord earned his M.A. in Economics from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland and his MBA at the University of California in Berkeley.

#### **Michael Sebastian**

#### **Hewitt EnnisKnupp**

#### mike.sebastian@aonhewitt.com

Mike Sebastian, Partner, co-heads the firm's Investment Policy Services group. Additionally, he serves as a primary consultant for a select number of Hewitt EnnisKnupp retainer and project clients.

Mike has co-authored a number of research articles published in the Journal of Portfolio Management, the Journal of Private Equity and the Journal of Investing, two of which received a Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy award for outstanding research. He has spoken before industry groups on topics such as risk budgeting and performance benchmarking. Mike has served as an adjunct faculty member at Northwestern University, and is a

member of the board of directors of the Midwest Finance Association.

Prior to joining EnnisKnupp in 1997, he was head teaching assistant for core finance for the Department of Finance at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign.

Mike holds B.S. and M.S. degrees in finance from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

#### Don C. Stracke, CFA, CAIA

#### **Senior Consultant**


**NEPC** 

Don began his investment career in 1985, and he joined NEPC in 2009. Working out of our Redwood City, CA office, his consulting responsibilities include exclusively Public Pension Funds. Don is a member of the Large Cap Equity Advisory Group and the Alternative Assets Committee.


Prior to joining NEPC, Don was the Director of Marketing/Client Service at Shenkman Capital Management and Attalus Capital. At both firms, he was responsible for the overall management and execution of sales, marketing, and client service and was a member of the executive committee. Prior to Attalus, Don spent seven years as the Director of Corporate Client Services for Dresdner RCM Global Investors. Don's previous work experience includes eight years at Bankers Trust, where he was an investment consultant working with some of the most sophisticated plan sponsors in the country in the areas of risk measurement and analysis, asset allocation, and manager search.

Don received his bachelor's degree from Farleigh Dickinson University and his M.B.A. from Rutgers University. In addition, he holds the Chartered Financial Analyst and the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst designation.

#### **HOTEL GUIDE**







□ ■ Kleinwort Benson
□ □ Investors

## **KBI Water Presentation**

Steve Falci, CFA – Head of Strategy Development Kieran Stover – SVP, Business Development Why Invest in Water?


How do you invest in Water fit in a portfolio?

Performance

Additional Slides

### What does KBI mean by investing in Water?





### Examples of water usage





16.5 gallons of water to make 1 can of soda



37 gallons to produce 1 cup of coffee



264 gallons of water to make 2.21bs of rice



689 gallons of water to process one gallon of beer




1,500 gallons of water to make one pound of beef



2,905 gallons of water to make one semi-conductor wafer




39,090 gallons of water to make one car




### Investment driver: water demand rising





### Investment driver: water supply finite






There is no substitute for water which is why it is the "Blue Gold" of this century

### Investment driver: regional supply imbalances





## Investment driver: regulation increasing globally










- EU WaterFrameworkDirective
- EU Drinking water
   Directive
- HouseholdMetering by 2020

- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- Safe Drinking Water
   Act
- US Coastguard Ballast Water regulation

- 71 new standards for drinking water
- Network to monitor water quality
- 12<sup>th</sup> Fifth Year Plan priority





More than 50% of investment should be in water

### Investment Driver: Innovative Technology Solutions



- Water Metering
- Irrigation
- Leak detection and repair
- Cleaning waste water and purification
- Desalinization
- Filtration and Disinfection





### Opportunities in water

□ Kleinwort Benson
□ □ Investors

### **Utilities**

### Infrastructure

### **Technology**

- Regulated utilities
- Non-regulated utilities
- Emerging markets utilities

- · Pipes, plumbing
- Pumps and fluid control
- Irrigation equipment
- Construction
- Engineering and consulting

- Analytical equipment
- Water treatment
- Chemicals
- Meters








The listed stocks are a representative sample of stocks that may or may not be in the strategy. Size or profitability have not been used in determining the selection of stocks and their inclusion should not be construed as a stock recommendation.

Master Page No. 19

# Active management based on bottom-up and top-down analysis



### Water investment themes




Emerging market growth	China: 12 <sup>th</sup> '5 Year Plan' Urbanisation/Infrastructure Global Companies	China Everbright SABESP Danaher
Developed Market Rehabilitation	Chronic under-investment Ageing infrastructure	Xylem Pure Technologies
Regulatory Support	Metering, Testing, Filtration Supportive Utility Regulation Ballast water	Pentair American Water Works Calgon Carbon, Danaher
M&A Activity	Accretive acquisitions Strong balance sheet Targets	Pentair Flowserve Pure Technologies
Industrial Projects	Multi Year Cap Ex Secular Drivers Strong Leading Indicators	Flowserve Ebara Sulzer

The listed stocks are a representative sample of stocks that may or may not be in the strategy. Size or profitability have not been used in determining the selection of stocks and their inclusion should not be construed as a stock recommendation.

## Water: high Emerging Market exposure




### Revenue Exposure



## Multiple end-market drivers




### Portfolio end-market drivers



Source: Kleinwort Benson Investors as at June 30th 2013

### Cycles matter for Water...now mostly troughing






### Outlook: strong EPS growth from here



KBI Water vs. MSCI: Valuation
Forward P/E ratio (bottom up estimates)



Average multiple, but strong earnings growth

Still expecting double digit EPS growth in 2013

& 2014



### Key summary points Water



Investment Thesis: Strategy Accesses: Strategy Delivers:

KBI

**Supply:** < 1% of the world's water is available for use<sup>1</sup>

**Demand:** expected to grow by more than 40% by 2030<sup>2</sup>

\$22 trillion investment will be spent on **required water infrastructure** through 2030<sup>3</sup>

Increased Regulation & New Technologies

A \$500 billion global market

**Emerging Markets** 

Infrastructure spending

Natural resource scarcity

M&A

Small/mid cap stocks

Diversification - very small overlap with MSCI World

Moderate risk, Beta = 1.0

**Active Management** 

A broad opportunity set of solution providers accessing a range of end markets

High conviction 40-50 stock portfolio.

Outperformed global equities 10 of last 12 years<sup>4</sup>

Outperformed water index over 1,3,5 and 10 years<sup>5</sup>

Experienced specialist team

Managing this strategy since 2001


Early mover in water investing

<sup>&</sup>quot;Water, Our Thirsty World," National Geographic, April 2010; McKinsey Global Institute, Resource Revolution: meeting the world's energy, materials, food, and water needs,
November 2011; Jacobs Securities, Global Water Primer, April 2011, referencing Booz Allen Hamilton; Based on Water strategy, vs MSCI World index, So Sonetwork Water Index
as at June 30th, 2013. See performance disclaimer for full Sonetwork note

Master Page No. 27

### Water as an infrastructure investment






Source: Kleinwort Benson Investors Master Page No. 28

### Water: Very attractive risk/reward





# A consistent long-term equity opportunity




Rolling 3 Year returns over the last 10 years

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	10 yrs p.a.
MSCIEM	MSCI EM	MSCI EM	MSCI EM	MSCI EM	KBI Water	MSCI EM	Russell 2000	MSCI EM	Russell 2000	MSCI EM
12.8	22.8	38.4	31.0	35.6	-2.9	5.4	2.2	20.4	12.3	16.9
Russell 2000	KBI Water	KBI Water	KBI Water	KBI Water	MSCI EM	KBI Water	MSCI EM	Russell 2000	Russell 1000	KBI Water
6.3	15.1	28.0	26,1	20.3	-4.6	-2.9	-0.03	15.6	11.1	13.2
KBI Water	MSCI EAFE	MSCI World	Russell 1000	Russell 1000	KBI Water	Russell 2000				
0.5	12.3	24.2	20.4	17.3	-6.9	-5.1	-2.4	14.8	10.9	9.7
MSCI EAFE	Russell 2000	Russell 2000	MSCI World	MSCI World	MSCI World	Russell 1000	KBI Water	KBI Water	MSCI World	MSCI EAFE
-2.6	11.5	22,1	15,2	13.3	-7.6	-5.4	-3,2	12.0	7.5	8.7
MSCI World	MSCI World	MSCI World	Russell 2000	Russell 1000	Russell 2000	MSCI EAFE	MSCI World	MSCI World	MSCI EM	MSCI World
-3.5	7.4	19.3	13.6	9.1	-8.3	-5.6	-4.3	11.8	5.0	8.1
Russell 1000	Russell 1000	Russell 1000	Russell 1000	Russell 2000	Russell 1000	Russell 2000	MSCLEAFE	MSCI EAFE	MSCI EAFE	Russell 1000
-3.8	4.3	15.4	11.0	6.8	-8.7	-6.1	-6.6	8.2	4.0	7.5

### Adding Value through Active Management





Source: Kleinwort Benson Investors and DataStream. MSCI benchmark returns assume the reinvestment of dividends after the deduction of withholding taxes. See performance disclaimer at end of presentation for further information. Returns are gross of fees in USD as of 30 June 2013. Water Stocks represented by the S-Network Global Water Index and Information Ratio is measured in relation to value added above the S-Network Global Water Index. 'The S-Network Global Water Indexess\*\* are calculated, distributed and marketed by S-Network Global Indexes, LLC which have been licensed for use. All content of the S-Network Global Water Indexes © 2011 are the intellectual property of S-Network Global Indexes, LLC.'





# Water theme investing has provided sustainable outperformance for over a decade



Beta: 0.99

**Excess Return: 5.0%** 





Source: Kleinwort Benson Investors, based on monthly gross performance from January 2001 to June 30<sup>th</sup> 2013, \*Gross returns, KBI less MSCI World, in US\$. See performance disclaimer at end of presentation for further information.

### Strategy Performance Report

Strategy: Water

Benchmark: MSCI World (NR) Index

Strategy Inception: 5 December 2000


Base Currency: US Dollar

Reporting Date: 30 June 2013

Live Term (Yrs): 12.6
Return Type: Gross


Reporting Currency: US Dollar

Cumulative Performance (%)						
Period	Strategy	Benchmark	Excess	TE	IR	
1 Month	-5.4	-2.5	-3.0	-	-	
3 Months	-1.0	0.6	-1.6	-	-	
YTD	8.8	8.4	0.3	-	-	
1 Year	27.3	18.6	7.3	-	-	
3 Years pa	17.2	13.7	3.1	5.55	0.55	
5 Years pa	4.1	2.7	1.3	6.54	0.20	
7 Years pa	6.6	3.4	3.1	6.54	0.48	
10 Years pa	12.6	7.2	5.0	6.59	0.76	



Volatility (%)					
Period	Strategy	Benchmark			
3 Years pa	16.13	15.22			
5 Years pa	22.13	20.15			
10 Years pa	18.08	15.92			

Calendar Year Performance (%)							
Year	Strategy	Benchmark	Excess				
2003	38.5	33.1	4.0				
2004	34.6	14.7	17.3				
2005	12.5	9.5	2.8				
2006	32.4	20.1	10.2				
2007	16.7	9.0	7.0				
2008	-40.9	-40.7	-0.4				
2009	32.1	30.0	1.6				
2010	15.6	11.8	3.4				
2011	-8.5	-5.5	-3.1				
2012	28.2	15.8	10.6				



Source: KBI, Datastream, Bloomberg. Returns are gross of fees in USD to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2013. MSCI World Net Return benchmark returns assume the reinvestment of dividends after the deduction of withholding taxes. See disclaimers for further information.



Global client base

Specialised investment firm

Passionate belief in products and processes

Part of Kleinwort Benson Group



Pioneers in dividend-based investment

Meet highest international regulatory standards

AUM: US\$5.2bn/ €4bn/£3.4bn\* Pioneers in environmental equity investing

## Representative clients















































Norfolk County Retirement System



Painters and Allied
Trades Union



Louisiana Firefighters



Louisiana Municipal Employees Retirement System



Austin Police



Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico

## Specialist investment management

### **International** experts

Companies



Niche brokers

Working in Dublin Specialist investor research

Industry conferences

Industry consultants

Over 150 management meetings per year Tier 1 access to investment conferences

KBI proprietary research

## Investment process: multiple sources of return



Define each theme precisely:

Pure plays

or

Market leaders

Set sector weights
Focus: Fundamentals
and valuation
Overlay: Top down
influences

Select stocks







Investment universe

Optimal sector weights

Concentrated, high conviction portfolio

## Specialist stock selection = alpha generation

<b>Kleinwort Benson</b>
Investors

#### **Sector Analysis**

Life cycle of sector Structure of value chain Sector Themes

#### **Company Analysis**

Management
Competitive advantage
Position in
value chain
Corporate governance

#### **Financials**

Quality balance sheet Access to capital Quality of earnings







#### **Valuation**


- Free cash flow models
  - Valuation multiples



#### Portfolio construction

- Strong fundamentals,
- Attractive valuation,
- · Sector exposure reflect theme drivers,
  - Desired risk characteristics

## Proprietary risk/reward analysis



1. What do we own that we "shouldn't"?

2. What do we not own that we "should"?

Are any themes emerging?

Source: Kleinwort Benson Investors, Generated August 2, 2012

## KBI Environmental team biographies

<b>Kleinwort</b>	Benson
Investors	



**Noel O'Halloran**, B.E., C.DiP A.F., A.S.I.P, Director - Chief Investment Officer 25 years industry experience, 21 years with the firm

Noel joined the firm in 1992, was promoted to Head of Equities in 1996 and was appointed CIO in 2002. As CIO, he has overall responsibility for investment process and performance of the firm's assets under management across the various asset classes and specialist equity portfolios. The firms team of investment professionals report to Noel. He has specifically managed equity portfolios across Irish, European, Asian and US equity markets. Prior to joining the firm, Noel worked for Irish Life Investment Managers as a US Equity Asset Manager. He is an engineer by profession having graduated with 1st Class honours degree from University College Cork. He is a member of the CFA Institute, the Society of Investment Analysts in Ireland and the UK Society of Investment Professionals.



**Steven A. Falci**, CFA, BS, MBA, MA Head of Strategy Development – Sustainable Investment 27 years industry experience, 5 years with the firm

Steven Falci oversees the development of Kleinwort Benson Investors sustainable investment products and strategic priorities. He joined the firm in 2008 in the newly created position of Vice President – Sustainable Investment. He is a senior investment professional with over 25 years of broad experience overseeing investment teams and managing assets at a large pension fund, an institutional asset manager and a mutual fund company. Prior to joining the firm, Steve was CIO, Equities with the Calvert Group, where he oversaw the equity and asset allocation portfolios for the largest family of socially responsible mutual funds in the US. Before joining the Calvert Group, Steve was Senior Vice President, Senior Portfolio Manager and Principal at Mellon Equity Associates. Steve has a BS and MBA from the Stern School of Business at New York University, an MA from Pittsburgh Theological Seminary and is a CFA charter holder.

Master Page No. 42

## KBI Environmental team biographies (continued)

<b>Kleinwort</b>	Benson
Investors	



Catherine Ryan, BA International Business
Portfolio Manager- Environmental Strategies
13 years investment experience, 5 years with the firm

Catherine is a portfolio manager for the Kleinwort Benson Investors Water Strategy and is responsible for the development of investment strategy as well as the day to day management of the strategy. She joined the Environmental Strategies team in October 2009 and has been at the firm since 2008 when she joined to manage the firm's Irish equity portfolios. She has 12 years of investment management experience. Prior to joining the firm, Catherine worked for various fund management companies including Seneca Capital Management in San Francisco, Goodbody Stockbrokers and Pilot View Capital in Ireland. Catherine holds a BA International Business from Dublin City University and is a registered representative of the Irish Stock Exchange. Catherine has also completed Level 1 of the



Matthew Sheldon, CFA, BS, MBA
Portfolio Manager- Environmental Strategies
11 years investment experience, 2 years with the firm



Matt is a portfolio manager for the Kleinwort Benson Investors Water Strategy and is responsible for the development of investment strategy as well as the day to day management of the strategy. Matt joined the Environmental Strategies team in April 2011. He has extensive specialist knowledge and experience in investing in the water sector, including both global public listed equities and private equity. Prior to joining the firm, Matt worked at Water Asset Management where he was an Investment Analyst and at Wedge Capital Management where he was an Equity Analyst. Matt graduated summa cum laude from Tufts University with a BS in Chemical Engineering, holds an MBA in Finance from Columbia Business School and is a CFA charterholder.



## Infrastructure Defined



#### Infrastructure can be categorized broadly into four key sectors



## Infrastructure Defined, again



#### Infrastructure can be categorized broadly into four key groups

#### **Throughput** Regulated Contracted Social Electricity District Energy Roads Hospitals Transmission & Aged Care Midstream Energy Tunnels Distribution Power Generation Bridges Schools Gas Transmission Communications **Airports** Courthouses & Distribution Towers Rail Links Prisons Water & Waste-Storage Water Ports Waste Waste

#### Characteristics of Infrastructure



#### **Characteristics of Infrastructure**

Essential services supporting the community

Capital intensive/ high barriers to entry

Underlying cashflows linked to inflation

Low demand elasticity

Long operational life

Stable, predictable, cashflows

Low correlation with other asset classes















#### **Active Management**

Improved operational performance

Revenue growth

Operating cost control

Cost effective capital expenditure

Optimal capital structure

#### **Benefit to Investors**

Stable returns and low volatility

Portfolio diversification


Inflation hedge

Long duration and asset/liability matching

## Why Invest In Infrastructure?



#### Investors' Reasons for Investing in Infrastructure Opportunities<sup>1</sup>



## Inflation Protection



Infrastructure can provide an effective hedge against inflation through inflation-linked revenue streams

Assets	Examples	
Volume / Throughput Assets	<ul> <li>Roads generally have long-term concessions that permit toll increases that are linked to inflation</li> </ul>	
Regulated Assets	<ul> <li>Regulated utilities operate within a framework based on the company earning a return on its regulated capital base</li> <li>The capital base reflects nominal capital invested in the business</li> </ul>	
Contracted Assets	Waste management companies enter into municipal contracts that often contain annual escalators linked to CPI metrics	

## Looking Forward: Macro Considerations



#### Opportunities will arise through a range of factors

#### Large, Diverse Opportunity Set

- Substantial private investment opportunity across all infrastructure sectors, with over 630 transactions announced in the United States and Canada since 2007
- Need for an estimated \$6.5 trillion of investment from the public and private sectors through 2035

# Corporate Repositioning & Distressed Sellers

- Corporates and infrastructure funds are selling assets:
  - Burdened with excessive leverage
  - Sales of non-core infrastructure assets
  - Assets sales follow strategic change

# Governments Under Fiscal Strain

- Municipalities, State and Federal governments are struggling to fully finance infrastructure requirements
  - 22 U.S. States with deficits
- Reduced ability to increase taxes in order to fund infrastructure investment

## North American Infrastructure Opportunity



#### Investment opportunities driven by compelling macro and sector trends

Population Growth and Urbanization

Historical Underinvestment

Limits on Traditional Funding Sources

Utilities & Energy Infrastructure

Transportation Infrastructure


Communications Infrastructure


> Waste Management

- Take-private of utilities in public markets
- Regional gathering transport capabilities must meet production at new large shale fields; large pipelines being built to take production to key demand centers
- Desire for energy diversification and legislative support driving renewable opportunities
- Need to upgrade existing road, rail and airport networks and build additional capacity on congested routes
- Government agencies under fiscal pressures looking to monetize existing assets
- Emerging opportunities in the airports sector led by the FAA Airport Privatization Program
- Surging demand due to increased adoption and usage of wireless data devices
- High-quality communication assets exhibit multiple infrastructure characteristics
- Concentrated market at the larger end with continued consolidation expected at the fragmented medium to smaller end
- Opportunities from exploiting landfill gas deposits at municipal solid waste disposal facilities via landfill gas to energy projects

## Types of Opportunities MIRA Considered







Source: MIRA investment professionals Includes opportunities reviewed from Jan 2012 through Feb 2013

## Long-term Returns



- Stable cash flows from infrastructure assets can deliver a significant portion of returns through yield
- Timing and magnitude of yield is a function of asset stage, capex requirements and growth profile

#### Illustrative returns of infrastructure sub-sectors<sup>1</sup>

Asset Type	Average Cash Yield	Target Returns	
Ports / Marine Terminals	4 – 6%	13 – 17%	
Waste Management	3 – 5%	12 – 19%	
Midstream	5 – 10%	11 – 17%	MORE
Telecommunications Infrastructure	3 – 5%	13 – 17%	RISK
Toll Roads - Greenfield	5 – 10%	12 – 16%	
Airports	4 – 9%	12 – 16%	
Long-term Contracted Power Generation	4 – 12%	9 – 13%	LESS
Toll Roads - Mature	4 – 9%	8 – 12%	RISK
Regulated Assets	4 – 9%	9 – 13%	
PFIs / PPPs	6 – 12%	8 – 12%	

<sup>1.</sup> Macquarie, December 2011. Yield and IRR estimates are illustrative only and may not be achieved for any given asset type or specific investment. Long-term contracted power generation includes renewable energy generation assets. Indicative cash yield from greenfield toll roads reflects expected yield following construction completion and initial traffic rampup.



Master Page No₁ 54

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The Opportunity Capital Allocation – A Tool to Provide Maximum Flexibility with Implementation

Peter Hill Partner



An Aon Company 56

#### Opportunity Allocation: The Concept

- Asset allocation is the most important factor dictating long-term performance
- Constraints of a formal asset allocation policy should not impede investors from investing in attractive or innovative opportunities
- An Opportunity Allocation creates flexibility within the Investment Policy Statement to make investments that may not fit within a traditional asset allocation construct
- Strategies considered should offer a compelling potential return enhancement and/or diversification benefits (risk reduction)
- Optimal for investors with existing well-diversified portfolios that encompass both traditional and alternative asset classes and who are seeking additional flexibility

#### Rationale for Creation of an Opportunity Allocation

- From time to time, investors may be faced with opportunities that are truly "opportunistic" in nature
- Not all investment opportunities fit neatly within clearly-defined asset class lines
- Commitments to potentially attractive investments may be relatively small and not warrant the creation of a dedicated target allocation at the present time

An Opportunity Allocation provides maximum flexibility to access interesting and attractive opportunities, by removing some constraints of a formal asset allocation policy

#### Opportunity Allocation: Challenges and Desirable Investor Characteristics

- Challenges of an Opportunity Allocation include:
  - ComplexityDefining Time/Objective
  - Illiquidity– Higher Fees
  - Sourcing of FundsBenchmarking
- A robust governance structure is <u>critical</u> to its success
  - High degree of comfort with various constituents developing and promoting new ideas
  - Nimble, but sound, decision-making process
  - Comfort with ideas that do not fit neatly into "traditional" investing
  - Willingness to be different than peers at times
  - Willingness and ability to allocate additional time to investigate and monitor new ideas
  - Ability to terminate managers as needed



#### Opportunity Allocation: Implementation

- Design as a maximum allocation as opposed to a target
- Suggest an allowable range of 0% to no more than 10%
- Opportunity Allocation policy target should 'float' to be generally in line with the actual allocation to the category over time
- Source of funds should be liquid public securities and linked to the role of the investment

#### Benchmarking the Opportunity Fund

# The overarching objective of an Opportunity Allocation is to provide return enhancement and/or diversification relative to the opportunity cost of capital

- Suggest benchmarking the Opportunity Allocation, as a whole, to a blend of liquid returnseeking and risk-mitigating assets (i.e., stocks & bonds)
- An alternative approach is to use the weighted average of the underlying strategy benchmarks
- The underlying strategies can span the gamut in terms of risk and return characteristics
  - Utilize category or style-specific benchmarks
- Performance should be evaluated over a full market cycle, at two levels
  - Portfolio level: Is the overall Opportunity Allocation meeting stated goals
  - Strategy level: Are underlying strategies performing in line with expectations
- Important to also assess performance from a qualitative standpoint to ensure that stated goals are met



#### **Evaluating Strategies for the Opportunity Allocation**

- Potential strategies of interest should provide one or more of the following:
  - Superior expected returns relative to the rest of the portfolio
  - High degree of diversification relative to the rest of the portfolio
  - Attributes that the Policy portfolio does not capture
- Points of consideration when selecting strategies may include:
  - Impact on overall portfolio risk and return characteristics or "fit" within portfolio
  - Liquidity and lock-ups
  - Complexity
  - Leverage
  - Fees
- Ultimately, each investor will have their own "maximum tolerance" in terms of various risks introduced via an "opportunistic" investment

#### Developing a Framework for Opportunity Allocation Investments

- Given the unique nature of the allocation, there should be a clearly-defined framework to assess potential opportunities, including:
  - Rationale
  - Expected characteristics
  - Portfolio benefits
  - Risks
  - Source of funds
  - Benchmarks
  - Review procedures and exit strategy
- The nature of the strategies/asset classes that are candidates for this category may vary significantly
- Hence, the underlying due diligence should be customized to suit the unique attributes of each type of strategy/asset class



## **Opportunity Fund Framework Summary**

 Recommend below summary framework be utilized when ideas for the Opportunity Allocation are considered

Investment Objective	What risks are we trying to address or what opportunities are we trying to take advantage of?  Identify market risk/opportunity being targeted for more "opportunistic-type investments", and/or  Identify portfolio benefits that investment provides that long-term strategic asset allocation does not
New Investment Risks	<ul> <li>What risks (new or increased) do such investments bring?</li> <li>Identify new sources of risk or increases in types of risk that would result from pursuing such a strategy</li> <li>Identify environments when strategy will not be successful</li> <li>Identify risk mitigating factors</li> </ul>
Implementation Strategy	What should be the focus of implementation?  Identify the precepts that will drive manager/strategy selection
Other Factors:	<ul> <li>Fees</li> <li>Liquidity/Lock-up provisions</li> <li>Transparency</li> <li>Leverage</li> <li>Benchmarking</li> </ul>

#### **HEK Client Use of Opportunity Allocation**

- HEK clients have used the Opportunity Allocation for several years now, though there
  has been a recent uptick in its adoption typically 3 5% of fund assets
- Listed below are some examples of how clients have utilized an Opportunity Allocation:
  - Accommodate strategies not easily classified in traditional asset class terms
    - Absolute return, activist, tail risk hedging, real assets
  - Take advantage of dislocated markets at times of crisis
    - Convertible arbitrage in 2009, distressed investments 2009
  - Promote a level of confidence in decision makers with non-traditional strategies
    - Insurance linked securities funds (cat bonds, reinsurance)
  - Take advantage of timely new product offerings or capital raisings that are outside of traditional asset class boundaries
    - Hedge fund seeding ("Dodd-Frank" Act consequence)
- The investment universe for the Opportunity Allocation will continue to grow as periodic dislocations in segments of the financial markets are nearly certain to arise and new products are continually developed

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Presentation on:

# Ventura County Employees Retirement Association

26 September 2013



# Should we be afraid of the risks of hyperactive monetary policy?





### Overview: A Fed in transition




- Hyperactive monetary policy (HMP) is in full force for now, but we have reached an inflection point
- The benefits of HMP previously outweighed the costs; the balance is tipping
- Changes in the Fed's reaction function have emerged
- Changes in the Fed's leadership composition are imminent
- Eventually HMP will come to an end the critical question for investors is whether the end is due to success or failure
- We believe the economy is not prepared to handle a withdrawal of policy accommodation leading the Fed to re-engage or worse, accept inefficacy

Refer to Appendix for additional forecast and outlook information

## Hyperactive fiscal policy is on the decline



- Post-crisis, fiscal expansion skyrocketed in order to compensate for massive private sector deleveraging
- With fiscal policy in retreat, monetary policy has been the only game in town




As of 1 September 2013 SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (CBO) All years shown are fiscal year (October–September) Average since 1973–2012

## 2013 has seen significant fiscal contraction



PIMCO estimates fiscal contraction of ~1.25% of GDP in 2013, resulting from the expiration of the payroll tax cut, an increase in upper income tax rates and a partial implementation of the sequester



As of 1 September 2013

SOURCE: PIMCO, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Joint Committee on Taxation, Department of Commerce

Refer to Appendix for additional forecast and outlook information


Includes multiplier effects

Assumes full implementation of FY13 and FY14 sequester and reduced discretionary budget caps

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Includes fiscal contraction estimates

## Hyperactive monetary policy: Pushing the envelope






#### 2007 2008 2012 2009 2010 2011 2013 3) Soft power: Communication and forward guidance Dec 2008 "0 to 1/4 percent" "for some time" Jan 2009 Mar 2009 "for an extended period" Aug 2011 "at least through mid-2013" "at least through late 2014" Jan 2012 Sep 2012 "considerable time after economy strengthens" "at least through mid-2015" Dec 2012 "considerable time after asset purchase program ends" "at least as long as the unemployment rate remains

As of 1 September 2013 Source: FOMC, Bloomberg, PIMCO Refer to Appendix for additional forecast and outlook information

above 6.5%, inflation..." below 2.5%





# 4) Strategic repositioning: Prioritization of unemployment mandate over inflation mandate

Jun 20	)12	Two percent inflation target
Apr 20	)12	Janet Yellen introduces optimal control model
Nov 2	012	In a speech on Fed communication, Janet Yellen indicates
		"the FOMC can tolerate transitory deviations of inflation
		from its objective in order to more forcefully stabilize
		employment"

# Cost/benefit analysis of the Fed's hyperactive monetary policy



	Benefits	Costs
Inflation	<ul><li>Higher risk asset valuations</li><li>Housing</li></ul>	<ul><li>Potential for asset bubbles</li><li>Commodity based inflation</li><li>Inflation expectations</li></ul>
Leverage	<ul> <li>Higher cyclical consumption</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Leading to lower structural GDP growth and misallocation of capital</li> </ul>
Confidence in USD	<ul> <li>Helps export competitiveness</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Risks the U.S. losing reserve currency status and the Fed losing credibility</li> </ul>
Fiscal adjustment	<ul> <li>Less urgency for fiscal reform</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Less urgency for fiscal reform</li> </ul>
Financial stability	<ul> <li>Financial innovation jumps-starts the economy</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Too much financial innovation leads to financial instability later</li> </ul>
Policy uncertainty	<ul> <li>Less cyclical policy uncertainty</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>More secular policy uncertainty</li> </ul>

# Benefit: The good inflation | Risk assets



- The wealth effect spurs cyclical consumption:
  - Every \$1 increase in financial assets is associated with 3-5 cent increase in consumption
  - Every \$1 increase in housing prices is associated with 7-8 cent increase in consumption



As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO, Bloomberg


**Twist/Operation Twist:** Operation Twist describes a monetary process where the Fed buys and sells short-term and long-term bonds depending on their objective. Refer to Appendix for additional index and outlook information

# Benefit: The good leverage | Spurs cyclical consumption




Mtg Payment / Income (LHS)

 Lower debt service costs means more money available for near-term consumption



Disposable income continues to increase despite stagnant wage growth




As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO, Bloomberg

# Benefit: Devaluation of the dollar | Helps export competitiveness



• Fed balance sheet expansion, at a minimum, helps the US stay competitive amidst the global currency war




As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO

# Benefit: Financial stability | Assists financial innovation & intermediation



- CLO issuance approaching 2004 levels
- Consumer lending channels are normalizing, facilitated by the Fed's liquidity provision



As of 1 September 2013


Source: PIMCO; JPMorgan. Collateralized loan obligation (CLO)


## Benefit: Reduction in cyclical policy uncertainty



The Fed's pro-active stance has backstopped financial conditions, lowering asset market volatility

### **Asset Market Volatility**





As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO, Bloomberg Refer to Appendix for additional outlook information

# Cost: The bad inflation | Higher inflation expectations



### Signals to watch for: 5yr5yr breakeven inflation

Forward breakeven inflation is contained for now.



As of 1 September 2013 Source: Bloomberg


### Cost: The bad inflation | Asset market bubbles




### Signals to watch for:

- Equity multiples
- Credit spread levels
- House price / rent and income ratios
- Commodity prices versus marginal cost of production

 Concern over asset market bubbles is in our opinion the most important driver of the Fed's decision to put "tapering" on the table








As of 1 September 2013 Source: Bloomberg \* S&P 500


# Cost: The bad leverage and misallocation of capital











Source: Bloomberg **EOP:** End of period


### Cost: Less urgency for fiscal reform




### Signals to watch for:

- Debt service costs for U.S. government
- Foreign holdings of Treasuries
- Decreases urgency for fiscal reform interest cost remain low even as debt approaches highest post WW2 level relative to GDP

 So far Fed's purchases have displaced only domestic holders' share of Treasuries outstanding





Source: Bloomberg


# Cost: Too much financial innovation leads to financial instability later




### Signals to watch for: Leveraged debt issuance

High Yield net issuance at highest levels

CLO issuance approaching 2004 levels






As of 1 September 2013 Source: Bloomberg, JPM, PIMCO Refer to Appendix for additional outlook information

### Cost: Potential loss of Fed's independence



### Signals to watch for:

- Size of Fed balance sheet as % of GDP
- Sensitivity of Fed's balance sheet to rate shocks
- Markets demonstrating dependence on Fed easy policy and rhetoric rather than economic data



Source: Fed publication, "The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet and Earnings: A primer and projects" Refer to Appendix for additional outlook information

# Cyclical cost/benefit analysis of Fed's hyperactive monetary policy



	<u>Cyclical</u> Impact	Cyclical Cost (-) / Benefit (+) Analysis
Inflation	<ul> <li>The Fed has become increasingly concerned about asset market bubbles</li> </ul>	-
Leverage	<ul> <li>No signs of significant investments from government and private sector that can improve future productivity</li> </ul>	<del>-</del>
Dollar devaluation	<ul> <li>Dollar weakening has stopped and Emerging Markets seriously disrupted by Fed policy</li> </ul>	-
Fiscal adjustment	<ul> <li>HMP reduces the need for fiscal reform in the short term. Fiscal policy less of a drag than it otherwise would be</li> </ul>	+
Financial innovation and stability	<ul> <li>HMP helping consumer and corporate borrowers access capital markets, but concerns over excess financial leverage</li> </ul>	=
Policy uncertainty	<ul> <li>Reduced asset market volatility</li> </ul>	+

As of 1 September 2013

# The cost / benefit analysis at the Fed has shifted



Meeting Date	Communication	
FOMC Minutes September 2012	<ul> <li>"Participants again exchanged views on the likely benefits and costs of a new large-scale asset purchase programmost participants thought these risks could be managed"</li> </ul>	
FOMC Statement May 2013	<ul> <li>"The Committee is prepared to increase or reduce the pace of its purchases to maintain appropriate policy accommodation"</li> </ul>	
FOMC Minutes June 2013	"several members judged that a reduction in asset purchases would likely soon be warranted, in light of the cumulative decline in unemploymentin order to prevent the potential negative consequences of the program from exceeding its anticipating benefits"	

As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO, FOMC


### The reaction function of the Fed has shifted





- "...the FOMC can tolerate transitory deviations of inflation from its objective in order to more forcefully stabilize employment..."
- "A policy that reduces unemployment may, at times, result in inflation that could temporarily rise above its target."

-Fed Vice Chair Janet Yellen, November 2012



- "Our intent...was to use asset purchases as a way of achieving some near-term momentum.."
- "...slowing in the pace of purchases will be akin to letting up on the gas pedal as the car picks up speed"

-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, June 2013

# Is the Fed slowing accommodation because of success or failure?



 Ultimately hyperactive monetary policy will end. The critical question is "Why"? The paths have divergent implications

> Why end HMP?

#### **SUCCESS**

The economy achieves escape velocity

- Interest rates normalize in controlled manner
- Equities and credit struggle with higher rates, but are buoyed by a strengthening global economy
- The private sector continues to heal, taking the baton from the public sector

#### **FAILURE**

Costs and risks of HMP outweigh the benefits


- Interest rates rise in a volatile manner
- Equities and credit suffer significantly, losing Fed support, and prospect of endogenous and fundamental global growth
- Investors and business leaders lose confidence, growth and assets falter

As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO, FOMC

# Policy uncertainty complicates matters



The composition of the Fed in 2014 will be decidedly more hawkish than 2013, possibly losing 6
of its 7 most dovish members



As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO, FOMC

# Fiscal policy uncertainty lingers as well





"Dollar for dollar is the plan [in order to raise the debt ceiling]."

-Speaker Boehner, March 2013



"The only time the President gets serious is when Republicans use the debt ceiling to drag him kicking and screaming into negotiations."

-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, March 2013



"Republicans can act responsibly and raise the debt ceiling, or act irresponsibly and put the country through another economic crisis."

-President Obama, March 2013

# PIMCO expectations for future monetary policy



- Our view is that absent a negative economic shock, the Fed will end its balance sheet expansion over the next 9 months
- However, the Fed is likely to maintain its commitment to zero interest rate policy much longer than the market expects and will use forward guidance to strengthen that commitment
- The Fed is unlikely to sell securities over the next 3-5 years, possibly never selling MBS holdings
- The possibility of Larry Summers as chair would present uncertainty (and volatility), as his monetary policy framework is not well understood

Policy question	Our view
What is the likelihood of Larry Summers as Fed Chair nominee?	80%
When will QE end?	Q2 2014
When will Fed Funds first be raised?	Q2 2016
Will the Fed expand usage of forward guidance?	Yes

As of 1 September 2013 Source: PIMCO

### Overview: A Fed in transition



- Hyperactive monetary policy (HMP) is in full force for now, but we have reached an inflection point
- The benefits of HMP previously outweighed the costs; the balance is tipping
- Changes in the Fed's reaction function have emerged
- Changes in the Fed's leadership composition are imminent
- Eventually HMP will come to an end the critical question for investors is whether the end is due to success or failure
- We believe the economy is not prepared to handle a withdrawal of policy accommodation leading the Fed to re-engage or worse, accept inefficacy

# Investment implications of a Fed in transition



	Interest rate strategies		
	Overweight duration on the front end of the yield curve	The Fed policy rate is likely to remain near zero despite nearing end of balance sheet expansion	
Und	Underweight duration on the back end of the yield curve	Reduce risk where policy support is waning and long term fiscal imbalances create risk to investors	
	TIPS: Favor long maturities	Utilize inflation-linked bonds and other real assets to protect against the longer term inflationary risk of hyperactive monetary policy	

Strategic positioning		
Favor non-agency to agency MBS	<ol> <li>Non-agency MBS offer compelling loss-adjusted yields and are less directly dependent upon Fed accommodation</li> <li>Reduce agency MBS holdings as central bank actions leave sector fully priced and the Fed is soon to reduce purchases</li> </ol>	
Reduce credit risk	Fed policy withdrawal is likely to have a negative feedback loop to the real econ and risk assets, which have become dependent on monetary accommodation	

## Appendix



Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value.

#### **FORECAST**

Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein are based upon proprietary research and should not be interpreted as investment advice, as an offer or solicitation, nor as the purchase or sale of any financial instrument. Forecasts and estimates have certain inherent limitations, and unlike an actual performance record, do not reflect actual trading, liquidity constraints, fees, and/or other costs. In addition, references to future results should not be construed as an estimate or promise of results that a client portfolio may achieve.

#### INVESTMENT STRATEGY

There is no guarantee that these investment strategies will work under all market conditions or are suitable for all investors and each investor should evaluate their ability to invest long-term, especially during periods of downturn in the market.

#### **OUTLOOK**

Statements concerning financial market trends are based on current market conditions, which will fluctuate. There is no guarantee that these investment strategies will work under all market conditions or are suitable for all investors and each investor should evaluate their ability to invest for the long-term, especially during periods of downturn in the market. Outlook and strategies are subject to change without notice.

#### RISK

Investing in the **bond market** is subject to certain risks, including market, interest rate, issuer, credit and inflation risk. Investing in **foreign-denominated and/or-domiciled securities** may involve heightened risk due to currency fluctuations, and economic and political risks, which may be enhanced in emerging markets. **Sovereign securities** are generally backed by the issuing government. Obligations of U.S. government agencies and authorities are supported by varying degrees, but are generally not backed by the full faith of the U.S. government; portfolios that invest in such securities are not guaranteed and will fluctuate in value. **Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs)** issued by a government are fixed income securities whose principal value is periodically adjusted according to the rate of inflation; ILBs decline in value when real interest rates rise. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) are ILBs issued by the U.S. government. **Mortgage- and asset-backed securities** may be sensitive to changes in interest rates, subject to early repayment risk, and while generally supported by a government-agency or private guarantor, there is no assurance that the guarantor will meet its obligations.

This material contains the current opinions of the manager and such opinions are subject to change without notice. Statements concerning financial market trends are based on current market conditions, which will fluctuate. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission. PIMCO and YOUR GLOBAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY are trademarks or registered trademarks of Allianz Asset Management of America L.P. and Pacific Investment Management Company LLC, respectively, in the United States and throughout the world. ©2013, PIMCO.

# Appendix



#### **INDEX DESCRIPTIONS**

The S&P 500 Index is an unmanaged market index generally considered representative of the stock market as a whole. The index focuses on the Large-Cap segment of the U.S. equities market.

It is not possible to invest directly in an unmanaged index.

North America | Europe | Asia-Pacific



### **Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association**

September 26, 2013

John Allen Edmund Bellord

### Presenter



#### John Allen

Mr. Allen is a client relationship manager in GMO's Berkeley Office. Prior to joining GMO in 2009, he was vice president of investments for a large family office. Previously, he worked in the investment banking group at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette. He began his career in the business consulting group of Stern Stewart & Co. Mr. Allen earned his B.S. in Economics from the University of Virginia. He is a CFA charterholder as well as a CAIA charterholder.



#### **Edmund Bellord**

Mr. Bellord is a member of GMO's asset allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2008, he was a senior portfolio manager at State Street Global Advisors Capital Management. Previously, he worked at Mellon Capital Management as a strategist. Mr. Bellord earned his M.A. in Economics from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland and his M.B.A. at the University of California in Berkeley.

### **GMO Overview**

#### **GMO's Edge:**

We blend proven traditional judgments with innovative quantitative methods to identify undervalued securities and markets.

#### **Success Factors:**

Discipline, value orientation, investment research, risk control, size limitation.

#### **Motivation/Focus:**

Private partnership founded in 1977; investment management is our only business.

#### **Stability:**

GMO has low turnover of investment professionals.



#### **Current Scale:**

\$111 billion of assets under management, including:

Equities: \$71 billion
Fixed Income: \$11 billion
Natural Resources: \$2 billion\*
Asset Allocation: \$55 billion\*\*
Absolute Return: \$13 billion\*\*

More than 100 investment professionals and more than 500 employees worldwide.

Note: The asset breakout above may not include all underlying assets and thus may not add up to the total AUM figure shown.

Assets managed by GMO Renewable Resources, a joint venture, is not part of the GIPS compliant firm, GMO. GMO Renewable Resources has assets under management of \$1,743,116,316 as of 7/31/13.




<sup>\*</sup> Natural Resources include: 1) GMO Renewable Resources assets; and 2) assets of GMO's Resources Strategy.


<sup>\*\*</sup> Relevant Asset Allocation and Absolute Return assets are also accounted for within Equities and Fixed Income strategies.

## **GMO** Asset Allocation

### GMO 7-Year Asset Class Real Return Forecasts\*

### As of August 31, 2013









Source: GMO 4 Master Page No. 99

## GMO 7-Year Global Real Return Equity Forecasts\*

Value and growth within large and small stocks, and REITs, as of August 31, 2013









Master Page No. 100

### **GMO 7-Year Fixed Income Forecasts\***

As of August 31, 2013








Source: GMO (Master Page No. 101

## **Evolution of Real Equity Valuations**

As of August 31, 2013

### GMO 7-Year Asset Class Return Forecasts\* Stocks




\*The chart represents real return forecasts for several asset classes made as of the date stated and not for any GMO fund or strategy. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements. Forecasts are tools used by GMO and do not necessarily reflect actual asset allocation portfolio construction.



Source: GMO Master Page No. 102

### Real Absolute Return Portfolios over Time





Note: Based on GMO's 7-year asset class return forecasts. These forecasts above are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements.

Source: GMO As of 8/31/13

## What Are Corporate Profits?

Macro-economically speaking:


Profits = Net Investment

- + Dividends
- Household Savings
- Government Savings
- Foreign Savings




### Corporate Profits: The Macro Drivers


% of US GDP





## **Currency Forecasts**





<sup>\*</sup> Value Score measures current valuation of a currency vs. GMO's calculation of the Fair Value of the currency.

The chart represents currency forecasts for several currencies and not for any GMO fund or strategy. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements.




Source: GMO As of 7/31/13 11 Master Page No. 106

Dollar

# Country Valuations Around the World

### Europe is not burdened by high expectations










# Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy

## Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy





Bond Portfolio	
Bond Portfolio Duration	6 years
AAA	2%
AA	76%
A	3%
BBB	9%
Below Investment Grade	10%






The above information is based on a representative account selected because it has the least number of restrictions and best represents the implementation of the strategy. Weightings are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. Bond ratings are from Standard and Poor's.

Source: GMO 14 Master Page No. 109

## Must Be Unconventional and Dynamic


#### Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy





# GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy – Allocation History

*July 2001 – June 2013* 



**Note:** March 2013 allocations included a China Short position of -1%.

\*Cash & Collateral includes World Opportunity Overlay and other securities.



Allocations from 7/31/2001-7/31/2003 reflect the allocations of two separately managed accounts within the composite. Beginning 8/1/2003 the allocations are based on a representative account with the strategy selected because it has the least number of restrictions and best represents the implementation of the strategy. The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO's website in October 2012.

Source: GMO 16 Master Page No. 111

## Investment Objectives – and Record


#### Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy

#### **Objectives:**

- Seeks annualized excess returns of 5% (net of fees) above the Consumer Price Index over a complete market cycle
- Expected annualized volatility of 5% to 10% over a full market cycle

#### GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy\*

July 2001 - July 2013



	Gross Cumulative Return	Gross Compound Annual Return	Annualized Volatility	Sharpe Ratio <sup>1</sup>
GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy	299.3%	12.2%	8.4%	1.26
Global Equities (MSCI ACWI)	85.2%	5.3%	16.9%	0.21
S&P 500	76.5%	4.9%	15.5%	0.21
Barclays U.S. Aggregate	82.7%	5.2%	3.6%	0.96

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Sharpe Ratio = (portfolio return less risk free rate)/volatiltiy of annual returns

The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite appearing in the chart above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the "Composite"). Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served predominately as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy that also included a cash-benchmarked component. Since January 1, 2012, accounts in the composite have been managed as a standalone investment and has generally allocated a greater percentage of its assets to cash-benchmarked strategies.

Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Returns are presented gross of management fees and any incentive fees if applicable. Gross returns include transaction costs, commissions, withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. If management fees were deducted performance would be lower. For example, if the strategy were to achieve a 10% annual rate of return each year for ten years and an annual advisory fee of 0.75% were charged during that period, the resulting average annual net return (after the deduction of management fees) would be 9.25%. A GIPS compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part 2 of GMO's Form ADV and are also available in each strategy's compliant presentation. The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO's website in October of 2012.



<sup>\*</sup> Inception date: 7/31/2001


## **GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy**

#### Investment objectives and performance record

■ The Strategy seeks annualized excess returns of 5% (net of fees) above the Consumer Price Index, with annualized volatility of 5-10%, over a complete market cycle.



#### GMO Value Added:



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Inception date: 7/31/2001

The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite appearing in the chart above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the "Composite"). Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served predominately as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy that also included a cash-benchmarked component. Since January 1, 2012, accounts in the composite have been managed as a standalone investment and has generally allocated a greater percentage of its assets to cash-benchmarked strategies.

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
This information may be used only in one-on-one presentations with the recipient where an opportunity exits for the recipient to ask questions about the gross performance information. The recipient may not share this information with any third party.



## **GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy**

#### Annual performance, gross of fees

#### GMO Value Added:



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As of 7/31/13

The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite appearing in the chart above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the "Composite"). Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served predominately as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy that also included a cash-benchmarked component. Since January 1, 2012, accounts in the composite have been managed as a standalone investment and has generally allocated a greater percentage of its assets to cash-benchmarked strategies.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Inception date: 7/31/2001

## Appendix

### Representative Clients – Worldwide

#### **Endowments**

Appalachian Mountain Club University of Arizona Foundation

Babson College

Baylor College of Medicine

Baylor University Boston College Boston University

California Institute of Technology

Carnegie Institute

Carnegie Institution of Washington

Christian Theological Seminary

College of William and Mary Dartmouth College

University of Delaware

Duke University University of Hartford

Kansas University

Lawrenceville School

Lehigh University

University of Michigan

Northwestern University

Norwich University

Pepperdine University

Phillips Academy (Andover)

Phillips Exeter Academy

Pomona College

Princeton University

Santa Clara University

Southern Methodist University

Spelman College

Stanford University

Swarthmore College

Vassar College

University of Virginia

Yale University

#### **Public Funds**

Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation

**CalPERS** 

Dallas Police & Fire Pension System

City of Fairfax, VA

Massachusetts PRIM

Milwaukee County Empl. Ret. System

Orange County Empl. Ret. System

City of Richmond

San Diego City ERS

San Francisco City & County

Teacher Retirement System of Texas

Ventura County ERA

Virginia Retirement System

Washington State Investment Board

•

#### Sub-Advisory / Advisory

John Hancock Marks & Spencer

Wells Fargo

**Pension Funds** 

Andersen Corporation Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans

APL Limited National Bank of Canada BAE Systems National Geographic Society

BASF Corporation USA NCR - Scotland
The Boeing Company NiSource
Cargill NRECA

Church Pension Fund Partners HealthCare

ContiGroup JC Penney
Corning Pfizer

Dominion Resources PME (Bedrijfstakpensioenfonds Metalektro)

Dow Chemical Praxair, Inc.
FMC Corporation Sidley & Austin
John Hancock Siemens
Mayo Clinic SunSuper

Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Board Verizon

#### **Defined Contribution**

Ally Financial Parker-Hannifin
AMD Siemens

Century Link Investment Management Sprint
Novartis SunSuper

#### Foundations and Cultural Institutions

Abell Foundation The Memorial Foundation
California Academy of Sciences Metropolitan Museum of Art

The Cleveland Foundation Metropolitan Opera
Commonwealth Fund Nature Conservancy
Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation Polk Bros Foundation
Doris Duke Charitable Foundation Regenstrief Foundation
Father Flanagan's Foundation The Rockefeller Family Fund

Fetzer Institute Rotary International
Ford Foundation Surdna Foundation
Hewlett Foundation Toledo Museum of Art
Hilton Foundation Trustees of Reservations
Joyce Foundation Wenner-Gren Foundation
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts World Wildlife Fund

Yawkey Foundation

Kresge Foundation

Robert R. McCormick Foundation

Source: GMO As of 7/23/13 21 Master Page No. 116

GMO

JA\_VenturaCountyERA\_9-1

### **GMO Asset Allocation Investment Team**

#### Responsible for \$55 billion of client accounts

#### **Global Asset Allocation**

#### **Asset Allocation**

Jeremy Grantham, Chief Strategist James Montier Peter Chiappinelli Ben Inker, Co-Head of Asset Allocation

Sam Wilderman, Co-Head of Asset Allocation Ara Lovitt Kai Wu Nick Nanda

Matt Kadnar Jamie Lee

**Edward Chancellor** Anna Chetoukhina **Edmund Bellord** 

Tariq Ali

Erik Norton Catherine LeGraw

Chris Hudson

#### **Implementation**

Tom Hancock, Global Equities Tom Cooper, Fixed Income

David Cowan, Global Equities Drew Spangler, International Active

Arjun Divecha, Emerging Equities Jason Halliwell, Systematic Global Macro



### **GMO** Asset Allocation

#### What really matters



One true advantage: the long horizon




Overpaying is the greatest risk



Career risk governs the short run

## The Lonely Ballad of the Long-Term Investor

The built in advantages of the long-horizon




## The Way the Market Goes Around



## Spinning Your Wheels: A 60/40 Portfolio over Time

Overvalued markets can doom a static portfolio to poor returns for extended periods




Note: 60% U.S. Equities (S&P 500), 40% U.S. Bonds (U.S. Treasuries) rebalanced monthly

Past Performance is not indicative of future results.



### **GMO** Asset Allocation Credo

Harnessing the long horizon





## Benchmark-Free Investing with GMO

# A Firm Designed to Win

- Privately owned
- Aligned interests



#### Record


- Long, successful history
- Coordinated asset class and security selection

### **Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy**

 Seeks annualized excess returns of 5% (net of fees) above the Consumer Price Index over a complete market cycle

### **Experience**

- 25 years managing multiasset class portfolios
- Large dedicated team



## Philosophy and Process

- Conservative value bias
- Rare ability to focus on long-term horizon


## GMO Benchmark-Free: Casting a Wide Net

#### Representative universe

■ Liquid, transparent multi-asset portfolio

 Global targeted style, capitalization and regional exposures

- Integrated duration, credit and currency decisions
- Fully collateralized alternative strategies



**Note:** GMO may use some or all of the investment opportunities listed above.

## Risk Is the Permanent Impairment of Capital

### Three routes to the permanent impairment of capital:

#### ■ Valuation risk

Buying overvalued assets dooms you to low long-run returns.

#### **■** Fundamental risk

- "Real risk is measured not by the percent that a stock may decline in price in relation to the general market in a given period, but by the danger of a loss of quality and earnings power through economic change or deterioration in management." – *Ben Graham* 

#### **■** Financing risk

 Leverage – "An investor who proposes to ignore near-term market fluctuations needs greater resources for safety and must not operate on so large a scale, if at all, with borrowed money." – *Keynes*

## Summary – Why GMO for Benchmark-Free Investing?

#### Experience and Record

- Experienced in managing global asset allocation mandates over 100 institutions and
   25 years. A team of investment professionals dedicated to asset allocation.
- Long, successful history of making a few important bold bets that drive superior performance.
- Strong record of adding value at the asset class level across a broad set of asset classes.

#### Philosophy and Process

- Built-in conservative value bias which we believe helps to reduce the risk of capital loss.
- Obsessed with performance; understand the process of adding value at every stage of asset allocation.


#### ■ A Firm Designed to Win

- 100% owned by individual partners, low turnover of investment professionals.
- Coordinated team working together on asset allocation and portfolio implementation.
- Small enough to be flexible to clients' needs and to move quickly.



## Mean Reversion Drives Everything

The realized performance of our forecasts since June 1994






Analysis uses 7-year GMO asset class forecasts for 18 asset classes from June-1994 until Dec-2005 (start date is October-1996 for REITS and July-1997 for TIPS). GMO began making 7-year asset class forecasts in 2002 and previously made 10-year asset class forecasts. 10-year asset class forecasts are converted into 7-year forecasts by assuming 3 years of equilibrium returns at the end of the 7-year period. Returns and forecasts are annualized.

Source: GMO As of 12/31/12 32

### Equilibrium Returns vs. GMO Forecasts







GMO Forecasts for asset classes are forward looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements. No forecast relates to a GMO fund or strategy.

Source: GMO As of 8/31/13 33 Master Page No. 128

## S&P 500: Building a 7-Year Forecast

#### Components of annual return of S&P 500, with regression over 7 years








Source: GMO As of 8/31/13 34 Master Page No. 129

## High Quality: Building a 7-Year Forecast

Components of annual return of high quality stocks, with regression over 7 years




The chart represents a real return forecast for the above named asset class and not for any GMO fund or strategy. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results may differ materially from the forecasts above.




\*Return on equity as calculated by GMO. High Quality: Top 250 stocks ranked by quality in the largest 1000.

## Emerging Equities: Building a 7-Year Forecast

Components of annual return of emerging equities, with regression over 7 years









Source: GMO As of 8/31/13 36 Master Page No. 131

### If You Seek Unconventional Returns...

### Allocation Strategy to 6/30/13 14.0 12.1 Net Annualized Return (%) 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 5.4 4.9 4.5 2.0

**Inception of Benchmark-Free** 





Inception date of GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy: 7/31/2001

**MSCI ACWI** 

The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite appearing in the charts above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the "Composite"). Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served predominately as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy that also included a cash-benchmarked component. Since January 1, 2012, accounts in the composite have been managed as a standalone investment and has generally allocated a greater percentage of its assets to cash-benchmarked strategies.

**GMO** 

Benchmark-Free

Allocation

Strategy

The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO's website in October of 2012.

Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not indicative of future performance. Returns are shown after the deduction of management fees, transaction costs, and other expenses. The returns assume the reinvestment of dividends and other income. A GIPS® compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part 2 of GMO's Form ADV and are also available in each strategy's compliant presentation.

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S&P 500

Source: GMO As of 6/30/13 37 Master Page No. 132

60% MSCI

ACWI.


40% Barclays

US Agg. Bnd

## Especially in a Down Year...



(Net of Fees in USD)



Inception date of GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy: 7/31/2001

The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite appearing in the charts above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the "Composite"). Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served predominately as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy that also included a cash-benchmarked component. Since January 1, 2012, accounts in the composite have been managed as a standalone investment and has generally allocated a greater percentage of its assets to cash-benchmarked strategies.

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The minimum investment for managed accounts implementing GMO's strategies generally ranges from \$50 to \$200 million.




## Alpha Only


#### Framework

- Zero to negative equity beta
- Bond-like volatility
- Low correlation to stocks or bonds
- Portfolio constructed to maximize the opportunity to achieve annualized returns of T-Bills plus 1.5% 2%
- Two primary alpha sources:
  - Security selection
  - Implementation of AA Forecasts


### Role within a portfolio

- Alternative to cash or bonds
- "Dry powder"





## Alpha Only



This information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO's website in October of 2012.


Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Returns are shown after the deduction of management fees, transaction costs, and other expenses. The returns assume the reinvestment of dividends and other income. A GIPS® compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO's Form ADV and are also available in each strategy's compliant presentation.

### Alternative Asset Opportunity

#### Allocations as of June 30, 2013

#### Portfolio constructed to maximize the opportunity to achieve:


- Return of T-Bills plus 2% 3%
- Low volatility, liquid Global Tactical AA
- Low correlation to stocks or bonds



	Long	Short	Net
Stocks	38%	-9%	30%
Bonds	0%	-17%	-17%
Commodities	2%	-12%	-10%
Foreign Exchange	19%	-19%	0%
Cash	0%	-3%	-3%
Total	59%	-59%	0%

#### **Role within a strategy:**

- Alternative to cash or bonds
- Five sources of uncorrelated return





Tariq Ali

Mr. Ali is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO full-time in 2011, he was an intern with the Asset Allocation team. Mr. Ali earned his B.A. in Government from the University of Texas, Austin.

**Edmund Bellord** 

Mr. Bellord is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2008, he was a senior portfolio manager at State Street Global Advisors Capital Management. Previously, he worked at Mellon Capital Management as a strategist. Mr. Bellord earned his M.A. in Economics from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland and his MBA at the University of California in Berkeley.

Robert Brannan

Mr. Brannan is a member of GMO's asset allocation group. Previously, he was a member of GMO's investments control group. Prior to joining GMO in 2006, Mr. Brannan worked at Investors Bank & Trust as an account manager for fund accounting. Mr. Brannan earned his BA in Business Management from University of Massachusetts Amherst and MBA from Boston University. He is a CFA charterholder.

**Edward Chancellor** 

Mr. Chancellor is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team focusing on capital market research. He has worked as a financial commentator and consultant and has written for the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Financial Times, and Institutional Investor, among others. He is the recipient of the 2007 George Polk Award for financial journalism. Mr. Chancellor is the author of several books including *Crunch Time for Credit* (2005) and *Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation* (1999), a New York Times Notable Book of the Year. Prior to joining GMO in 2008, he worked as deputy U.S. editor for Breakingviews.com in New York and for Lazard Brothers. Mr. Chancellor earned his B.A. in History from Cambridge University, and his Master of Philosophy in Modern History from Oxford University.

Anna Chetoukhina

Ms. Chetoukhina is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2011, Ms. Chetoukhina was a fixed income quantitative analyst for Wellington Management. Previously, she was a research associate for State Street Associates, LLC. Ms. Chetoukhina earned her B.S. in Economics from Voronezh State University in Russia, her B.A. in Mathematics and Economics from Huntingdon College and her M.S. in Applied Mathematics from Northeastern University. She is a CFA charterholder.

Peter Chiappinelli

Mr. Chiappinelli is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2010, he was an institutional portfolio manager in the asset allocation group at Pyramis Global Advisors. Previously, he was the director of institutional investment strategy and research at Putnam Investments. Mr. Chiappinelli earned his MBA from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and his B.A. from Carleton College. He is a CAIA charterholder, and is the founder of the CAIA Boston chapter. He is a CFA charterholder.

Thomas Cooper

Mr. Cooper is the head of GMO's Fixed Income team. Before joining GMO in 1993, he was a managing director at Boston International Advisors. Prior to joining Boston International, he worked at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Western Asset Management and State Street Bank & Trust Co. Mr. Cooper received his MBA in Finance from the University of California (Berkeley) and earned a B.A. in Mathematics from Oberlin College. He is a CFA charterholder.

**David Cowan** 

Dr. Cowan is co-head of GMO's Global Equity team. Prior to joining GMO in 2006, he worked as a financial analyst and software developer for Nantahala Capital Management. Dr. Cowan earned his B.A. in Mathematics and Religion from Williams College, and his M.A. in Humanities from the University of Chicago. Additionally, he received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from Tufts University.

Arjun Divecha

Mr. Divecha is the head of GMO's Emerging Markets Equity team and Chairman of the GMO Board of Directors. Prior to joining GMO in 1993, he spent 12 years at BARRA directing software development, marketing, client service and emerging markets research and development. Mr. Divecha holds a Bachelor of Technology in Aeronautical Engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay and an MBA in Finance from Cornell University.

Jeremy Grantham

Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team, serving as the firm's chief investment strategist. Prior to GMO's founding, Mr. Grantham was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell. He is a member of the GMO Board of Directors and has also served on the investment boards of several non-profit organizations. Mr. Grantham has been featured in Forbes, Barron's and Business Week and is routinely quoted by the financial press. He earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an MBA from Harvard Business School.

Jason Halliwell

Mr. Halliwell is the head of GMO's Systematic Global Macro team. He joined GMO Australia in September 1999 from Westpac Investment Management where he spent three years in research and development of quantitative tactical asset allocation methods. Mr. Halliwell has an honours degree in Commerce/Law from Queensland University and has completed postgraduate studies in Financial Mathematics at the University of Technology in Sydney. He is a CFA charterholder.

Thomas Hancock

Dr. Hancock is co-head of GMO's Global Equity team and lead manager for U.S. and EAFE portfolios. Prior to joining GMO in 1995, he was a research scientist at Siemens and a software engineer at IBM. Dr. Hancock holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Harvard University and B.S. and M.S. degrees from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Christopher Hudson

Mr. Hudson is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2009, he worked at Bain Capital/Sankaty Advisors and DDJ Capital focusing on distressed and special situations investing. Mr. Hudson earned his A.B. in economics from Harvard University.

Ben Inker

Mr. Inker is co-head of GMO's Asset Allocation team and a member of the GMO Board of Directors. He joined GMO in 1992 following the completion of his B.A. in Economics from Yale University. In his years at GMO, Mr. Inker has served as an analyst for the Quantitative Equity and Asset Allocation teams, as a portfolio manager of several equity and asset allocation portfolios, as co-head of International Quantitative Equities, and as CIO of Quantitative Developed Equities. He is a CFA charterholder.

Matt Kadnar

Mr. Kadnar is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team focusing on research and portfolio management. Prior to joining GMO in 2004, he was an investment specialist and consultant relations manager at Putnam Investments. Previously, he served as in-house counsel for LPL Financial Services and as a senior associate at Melick & Porter, LLP. Mr. Kadnar has a B.S. from Boston College majoring in Finance and Philosophy and a J.D. from St. Louis University School of Law. He is a CFA charterholder.



Master Page No. 138

Tim Lang

Mr. Lang is a member of GMO's asset allocation team. Previously, he was a member of GMO's global quantitative trading group as well as a member of the investments control group. Prior to joining GMO in 2006, Mr. Lang worked as an account manager at Investors Bank & Trust. Mr. Lang earned his B.S. in Finance from Stonehill College.

Jamie Lee

Mr. Lee is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Previously, Mr. Lee worked at pi Economics as an economist. He earned his B.A. in Mathematics and English from Dartmouth College.

Catherine LeGraw

Ms. LeGraw is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2013, she worked as a director at BlackRock. Previously, Ms. LeGraw was an analyst at Bear, Stearns & Co. She received her B.S. and her B.A. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania. She is a CFA charterholder.

Diane Lopez

Ms. Lopez is the head of operations for GMO's asset allocation group. Previously at GMO, Ms. Lopez led GMO's quantitative equity trading group. Prior to joining GMO in 1995, she worked as a fund accountant at Investors Bank & Trust. Ms. Lopez earned her undergraduate degree in Economics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Ara Lovitt

Mr. Lovitt is the head of GMO's Corporate Credit team and the Portfolio Manager of the GMO Credit Opportunities Fund. He is also a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2010, Mr. Lovitt was a senior investment professional at Silver Point Capital. Previously, he was a vice president at Morgan Stanley. Mr. Lovitt earned his A.B. in Economics and Philosophy from Dartmouth College and his J.D. from Stanford Law School.

Mathew Marotta

Mr. Marotta is a trading support analyst within GMO's asset allocation group. Previously at GMO, he was a member of the information technologies group. Prior to joining GMO in 2007, he was a financial analyst at Fidelity. Mr. Marotta received his B.S. in Business Administration and Management Information Systems from Babson College.

James Montier

Mr. Montier is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2009, he was co-head of Global Strategy at Société Générale. Mr. Montier is the author of several books including *Behavioural Investing: A Practitioner's Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance; Value Investing: Tools and Techniques for Intelligent Investment*; and *The Little Book of Behavioural Investing*. Mr. Montier is a visiting fellow at the University of Durham and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. He holds a B.A. in Economics from Portsmouth University and an M.Sc. in Economics from Warwick University.

Nick Nanda

Mr. Nanda is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team focusing on research and portfolio management. He joined GMO in 2003 following the completion of his B.A. in Economics from Oberlin College. He is a CFA charterholder.

Erik Norton

Mr. Norton is a trader for GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2008, he was head trader for Tisbury Capital Management's North American team and head trader for Sowood Capital Management's event and catalyst-driven equities team. Mr. Norton earned his B.S. in Mathematics from MIT.



**Brooke Radosevic** Ms. Radosevic is a member of GMO's asset allocation group. Previously, she was a member of GMO's investments control group.

Prior to joining GMO in 2006, she worked as a custody accountant for Investors Bank & Trust. Ms. Radosevic earned her B.S in

Economics and Finance from Bentley College.

**Drew Spangler** Mr. Spangler is the head of GMO's International Active team. In addition, he is the portfolio manager responsible for Canada and

shares responsibility for the management of the U.S. equity portion of the Global Active strategy. Mr. Spangler joined GMO in 1993 following the completion of a B.S. in Systems Science and Mathematics at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a CFA

charterholder.

**Sam Wilderman** Mr. Wilderman is co-head of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Previously, he was co-head of the GMO Global Equity team and lead manager for U.S. quantitative portfolios. Prior to 2005, he was involved in research and portfolio management for the Emerging

Markets Equity team. He joined GMO in 1996 following the completion of his B.A. in Economics from Yale University. Mr.

Wilderman is a CFA charterholder.

Kai Wu Mr. Wu is a member of GMO's Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO full-time in 2010, he was an intern with the Asset

Allocation team. He earned his A.B. in Economics from Harvard College.





40 Rowes Wharf Boston, Massachusetts 02110 (617) 330-7500 | www.gmo.com



## **Research on Traditional Stock and Bond Investing**

Mike Sebastian
Partner




# Stocks: Conviction in Equity Investing

### Classifications of Manager Skill

Unskilled	Underperform on average after fees and trading costs	Net alpha < 0
No Evidence of Net Alpha	Earn enough excess return on average to cover fees and costs, but no more	Net alpha ≈ 0
Skilled	Outperform on average net of fees and costs	Net alpha > 0


Our research separates investment manager products into three categories based on statistical analysis of returns

### Manager Skill, 1975-2011



Manager skill has steadily declined since the 1990s, and we estimate that only about 2% of products demonstrate evidence of true skill today. Success with active management requires a high bar.

### **How Investment Committees Spend Time**



Source: Vanguard Investment Counseling & Research

Clients spend significant resources overseeing active managers; there is a fixed element to these soft costs that suggests an efficiency argument for using more active management if any is used at all


### Evidence on Outperformance of Higher Active Risk Managers

Study	Finding
Amihud and Goyenko [2012]	Funds with lower R <sup>2</sup> (greater deviation from the market) outperform
Baks, Busse and Green [2006]	Managers willing to take big bets outperform
Brands, Brown and Gallagher [2005]	More concentrated funds outperform
Cremers, Ferreira, Matos and Starks [2011]	The most active funds outperform; closet indexers underperform
Da, Gao and Jagannathan [2010]	High active share and aggressive growth managers outperform
Duan, Hu and McLean [2009]	Managers exhibit stock picking ability only in high-volatility stocks
Huij and Derwall [2011]	Fund managers willing to take big bets, and with broader investment strategies, outperform
Ivkovic, Sialm and Weisbenner [2008]	Households with more concentrated stock holdings earn better returns
Jiang, Verbeek and Wang [2011]	Managers' highest-conviction stock holdings outperform
Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng [2004]	More concentrated funds outperform
Petajisto [2010]	The most active stock pickers outperform; closet indexers underperform
Wang and Zheng [2012]	Hedge funds with strategies more distinctive from peers outperform
Wermers [2000]	Funds that trade more actively outperform

There is significant evidence of a link between investment manager products with higher active risk (higher conviction on the part of the manager) and value added


### Active Manager Value Added and Active Risk

#### Alpha by Level of Active Risk (Manager's Chosen Benchmark)



Our research finds a strong link between active risk and performance relative to the benchmark


#### Active Manager Value Added and Active Risk (cont.)



When fully adjusting for manager style and risk, we find value added *only* among the managers who take the most significant active bets

### Active Manager Skill and Active Risk

#### Skill Percentage by Level of Active Risk



Evidence of true skill is much stronger among the most active managers

#### A Risk Puzzle

- Institutional investors spend significant time and resources on active management
- But active management accounts for only a small amount (5% or less) of typical total fund risk
- Investors' portfolios are positioned to earn less alpha than they expect

#### A Solution

- We recommend that investors consider one of two directions with their public equity investments:
  - An Efficiency equity portfolio that is 100% indexed to a broad global equity benchmark
  - An Opportunity portfolio that maximizes the odds of success from active management in a high-conviction approach that is 80% or more actively managed
- We believe that the Efficiency model is optimal for most investors. Efficiency
  investors demonstrate conviction through a bold course of action of differing
  from peers who subscribe to the current model of active equity management.
- For investors unwilling to go to such extremes, at a minimum consider a strategy that combines indexing with high-conviction active strategies and avoids the expensive diversification of low active risk strategies and multitudes of actively managed portfolios.

#### A Call to Action

- We call on the major players in active equity management to step up their game:
  - Investment managers must focus on higher-conviction strategies that allow their skill to flow through to client returns, and reject low active risk strategies whose alpha is eaten up by fees and trading costs.
  - Consultants must also act with greater conviction, putting forward only their strongest recommendations, avoiding "safe" managers and being willing to recommend indexing instead in areas where credible products are lacking, or closed to new investors.
  - Asset owners must look within themselves to discover whether they are true believers. Those who are (the Opportunity investors) must demand conviction from managers and consultants, but also defeat their own valuedestroying tendencies to chase returns and fire underperformers.

## **Bonds:** Rethinking Fixed Income

### Focus on Risk Reducing Portfolio

- We have discussed many ways to enhance the return seeking portfolio; for example, "Go Big or Go Home", and "Conviction in Equity Investing."
- In an era of low expected returns, we also must invest in the most efficient risk-reducing portfolio.
- Corporate Defined Benefit plans are encouraged to de-risk through the use of a hedge portfolio.
- Other investors-Public Defined Benefit, Endowment, Foundation and Sovereign Wealth-should move away from the broad based bond benchmarks to fine tune the risk-reducing properties of fixed income.

### Risk Reducing Properties

- There are several desired characteristics for a risk reducing portfolio:
  - Low correlation
  - Low volatility
  - High volatility, IF correlation is negative
  - Downside protection: perform when the return-seeking, predominantly equity, portfolio experiences negative returns
- Achieving these properties at minimum cost is preferable.

### Intermediate versus Long Treasury Market

- We disaggregated the Treasury Index into the intermediate sector (1-10 years) and long sector (10+ years) to compare the risk-reducing qualities of both maturity sectors of the fixed income market.
- The Treasury Index was utilized to focus exclusively on the duration positioning of the risk-reducing portfolio.

## Hewittennisknupp

### **Correlation Sensitivity**

• In order to compensate for the higher volatility, the long sector must have a lower correlation to equity than the intermediate sector.

	60/40 Portfolio		90/10 Portfolio	
Assumed Intermediate Correlation	Long Sector Breakeven Correlation	Likelihood	Long Sector Breakeven Correlation	Likelihood
0.3	-0.6	<0.001%	0.09	<0.001%
0	-0.18	<0.001%	-0.03	3.6%
-0.3	-0.31	6.7%	-0.16	84%

Assumes volatility of 18%, 12% and 5% for equity, long sector, and intermediate sector, respectively.

#### **Downside Protection**

 Conventional wisdom asserts the long sector of the market provides better downside protection, but history does not support this assertion. We are biased by the most recent experience.

	Since 1926		Since 1970		Since 1980	
Months of Negative Equity Returns	Number of Months Intermediate Outperforms Long	Percent	Number of Months Intermediate Outperforms Long	Percent	Number of Months Intermediate Outperforms Long	Percent
Worst 25	16/25	64%	15/25	60%	12/25	48%
Worst 50	30/50	60%	28/50	56%	26/50	52%
Worst 100	55/100	55%	60/100	60%	58/100	58%


### Does the Long Sector Compensate for Additional Volatility

In a word, NO!

#### **Rolling 5 Year Return Difference**



### One Explanation for Lack of Risk Premium in Long Sector



#### Portfolio Implications

- Investors looking to manage the volatility of the return-seeking portfolio should invest the risk-reducing portfolio in intermediate fixed income.
- For those that are concerned about cash flow yield, recognize the yield reduction relative to the volatility reduction is minimal:
  - Reposition from Aggregate Index to Intermediate Aggregate Index,
  - Shorten duration by 1.35 years,
  - Yield reduction of 30 basis points,
  - One year breakeven yield change is only 22 basis points.





#### **Board of Retirement Investment Retreat**

September 26, 2013

Don C. Stracke, CFA, CAIA, Senior Consultant Allan C. Martin, Partner

### Agenda

- Public Fund Analysis
- NEPC Asset Class Assumption Setting
- California Public Plan Information (from San Jose)
- Initial Thoughts on Onboarding Process
- Initial Thoughts on Plan



**Greenwich Associates – Public Fund Analysis** 






## Greenwich Associates' 2012 research with U.S. institutional investors – this presentation is focused on Public Funds only.

 Each year Greenwich Associates interviews, in person, ~1,000 U.S. corporate and public pension plans, endowments and foundations and union funds with total assets over \$250 million.


 These in-person interviews were conducted from July through October of 2012.

 We interviewed 210 public funds, including 133 each with over \$1 billion in plan assets.

Greenwich Associates' U.S. Public Funds' Research Coverage 2012




Greenwich Associates' U.S. Public Funds' Research Coverage 2012





# Public Funds' primary challenge is meeting actuarial earnings rates – driving changes in asset allocation and within asset classes – while trying to de-risk.

#### **Most Important Issues Facing Public Funds 2012**



Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.

Data is based on open-ended comments from 206 U.S. institutional investors.

#### **Representative Quotes**

- "The issue we are facing is the funding status of the plan. We are still trying to get back to where we were prior to the 2008 losses. The way we are doing that is changing asset allocation by providing down side protection." – Public Fund
- "Investment performance and meeting our goals is a huge issue right now". – Public Fund
- "Funding is the biggest issue. We're addressing that in two ways: 1) we will probably reduce our assumed rate of return, and hope for interest rates to go up. 2) We are going to commit more money to alternative investments." – Public Fund
- "The issue is funded status and our ability to meet the target return." – Public Fund



## To achieve this Public plans are tweaking asset allocation and moving further into alternatives to enhance returns.

- Historically low interest rates and the current low yield environment continue to have pension fund executives reviewing their asset allocation and manager line-up, as well as benefits.
- As fund executives seek greater ratesof-return, a major area of focus is alternatives and how they can play a role in generating returns, reducing risk, and helping plans close their funding gaps.
- Future changes in public fund regulation is a concern among many plans executives, as is public perception.

#### **Representative Quotes**


- "So the question is do we start making changes or do we say this is a market cycle and we are going to work our way out of it? " - Public Fund
- "1) we will probably reduce our assumed rate of return, and hope for interest rates to go up. 2)
   We are going to commit more money to alternative investments." - Public Fund
- "We are starting to look at changes in benefits, and enhancing our yields on our investments in ways that are not the traditional to us. I am talking about alternative investments." – Public Fund
- "We have made some changes in our manager lineup to try to get more alpha with some different strategies." - Public Fund
- "We are concerned about the "demonization" of public pension plans. Employees have traded off a higher salary for a pension." - Public Fund

Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.




## Insufficient returns and declining interest rates have caused large funding gaps with less than 10% of pension plans fully funded.

U.S. Public Funds' Average Solvency Ratio of Defined Benefit Plans



U.S. Public Funds' Distribution of Solvency Ratio of Defined
Benefit Plans 2012




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12. Mean calculation excludes reported answers of "0" and / or "None". Results are for public fund defined benefit plans assets.



## Low economic growth has led plans to reduce anticipated returns, making funding challenges even more transparent.

### U.S. Public Funds' Average Actuarial Earnings Return on Defined Benefit Plan Assets



#### Representative Quotes


- "We are looking at alternative investment strategies to access additional gains from equities, and a lot of soul searching while looking at different investment vehicles. We have not gotten anywhere near the actuarial investment rate in ten years." – Public Fund
- "The most important thing is to be able to hit the assumed rate of return, which is becoming more challenging these days."
   Public Fund
- "We will probably reduce our assumed rate of return, and hope for interest rates to go up." – Public Fund

Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12. Mean calculation excludes reported answers of "0" and / or "None". Results are for public fund defined benefit plans assets.



## Turning to Public Funds' asset allocation, this showed notable movements out of traditional asset classes and into alternatives.

U.S. Public Funds' Institutional Asset Allocation (DB, Excluding DC)




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.



## A matched sample shows more clearly the move towards alternatives.

U.S. Public Funds' Institutional Asset Allocation, Matched Sample (DB, Excluding DC)




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.



## On the DB side, the ten-year picture clearly shows the dramatic change Public Plans have gone through in asset allocation.


U.S. Public Funds' Institutional Asset Allocation (DB, Excluding DC)



Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.



## The larger public plans rely less on domestic equities and more on alternatives than their smaller counterparts.




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.



# The over-funded public funds have more fixed income than others, but show fewer differences in asset allocation than their corporate counterparts.






Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.



### Investors expect to continue movements into alternatives with shifts out of U.S. equities and fixed income.

#### U.S. Public Funds' 3-Year Institutional Asset Allocation Expectations




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, US IIF-12.

Note: Three year outlook. "No Change" column indicates number of U.S. investors with no allocation changes planned for a given asset class. Results are for public fund defined benefit plan assets. Money market and 'other' are not shown.



Hedge funds continue to be an important part of portfolios, primarily as a way of achieving increased diversification and risk/return and increasingly as a way of improving returns.


U.S. Public Funds' Investment Objectives for Hedge Fund Investments



Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, U.S. IIF-12.



## The commitment to active management remains firm, with the share of assets managed passively holding within long-term bands.




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, U.S. IIF-12.

U.S. assets are projected to the 2012 Greenwich Associates universe of 2,357 U.S. institutional investors with \$250 million or more in total assets. Percentages are dollar-weighted. Results are public fund defined benefit plan assets.




## Despite continued pressures, fees paid by public funds have increased quite significantly.


**Average Fees Paid to External Managers** 




Average Fees Paid to Active U.S. Equity Managers




Average Fees Paid to Active International / Global Managers



Average Fees Paid to Active EME Managers



Average Fees Paid to Active Fixed Income Managers




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, U.S. IIF-12.

Note: Mean calculation shown excludes answers of "0" and/or "none". Shown in basis points.



## Domestic equity specialists at large public funds have just over 30% of their U.S. equity assets in traditional large cap strategies.

#### U.S. Public Fund Specialist Investors' Style-Specific Allocation of Institutional U.S. Equity Assets 2012 (DB)




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.

U.S. assets are projected to the 2012 Greenwich Associates universe of 101 U.S. equity specialist investors. Percentages are dollar-weighted. Results are for public fund defined benefit plan assets.



## International equity specialists among public funds report just under one quarter of the international / global assets in active EAFE mandates.

#### U.S. Public Fund Specialist Investors' Style-Specific Allocation of International Equity Assets 2012 (DB)




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.

U.S. assets are projected to the 2012 Greenwich Associates universe of 103 international equity specialist investors. Percentages are dollar-weighted. Results are for public fund defined benefit plan assets.



## For funds with fixed income specialists, core and core plus are still the bulk of the assets, albeit lower than a few years ago.

#### U.S. Public Fund Specialist Investors' Style-Specific Allocation of Fixed Income Assets 2012 (DB)




Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.


U.S. assets are projected to the 2012 Greenwich Associates universe of 95 fixed income specialist investors. Percentages are dollar-weighted. Results are for public fund defined benefit plan assets. \*Indicated new factors in 2012.



## Alternative hiring is expected to be very robust with the greatest demand in private equity, real estate and hedge funds.

U.S. Public Funds' Anticipated Hiring for Alternative Mandates in the Next 12-Months






Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.

Note: "Anticipated Hiring" refers to expected hiring of mandates or assignments in the next 12 months.



#### A very large portion of hedge funds are still fund-of-funds.

#### U.S. Public Funds' Style-Specific Institutional Asset Allocation of Hedge Fund Portfolios Assets 2012 (DB)



Source: Greenwich Associates 2012, USII-12.


U.S. assets are projected to the 2012 Greenwich Associates universe of 2,357 U.S. institutional investors with \$250 million or more in total assets. Percentages are dollar-weighted. Results are for institutional assets only: public fund defined benefit plan assets.



#### Current Trends in Sources of Funding for Public Funds

- Income used to fund pension programs generally comes from 3 sources
  - Investment Earnings
  - Member Contributions
  - Employer Contributions

2012 Public Fund Sources of Funding






#### Current Trends in Investment Assumption

#### **Investment Return Assumption**

Level of Funding

9.0%

The Average Investment Assumption from respondents was 7.7%, the same as in 2011






#### Current Trends in Funding Level

down below 76.1%


in 2011



40%

20%

50



Size by total participants

**Green Line: denotes 80% funding target identified by the Government Accountability Office** 

500

Red Line: denotes 70% funding target that Fitch Ratings considers to be adequate

5,000


50,000

500,000



#### Current Trends Asset Allocation in the Public Fund Market

- Consistent theme of <u>reducing equity</u> and <u>increasing alternatives</u> such as private equity, real estate, hedge funds & commodities
  - 2011 Current Equity Allocation was 39%



Other: Investments including but not limited to GAA, Timber, TIPS, Real Assets, Risk Parity, Infrastructure, MLP's, Natural Resources, and Opportunistic



## Assumption Setting at NEPC



#### Development of Asset Class Assumptions

- Relies on a combination of historical data and forward looking analysis
  - Expected returns based on current market pricing and forward looking estimates
  - Volatility based on history, while recognizing current uncertainty
  - Correlations based on a mix of history and current trend
- Historical data is used to frame current market environment as well as to compare to similar historical periods
  - Historical index returns, volatility, correlations, valuations, and yields
- Forward-looking analysis is based on current market pricing and a building blocks approach
  - Return equals yield + changes in price (valuation, defaults, etc.)
  - Use of key economic observations (inflation, real growth, dividends, etc.)
  - Structural themes (supply and demand imbalances, capital flows, etc.)
- Assumptions prepared by Asset Allocation Committee
  - Asset Allocation team plus members of various consulting practice groups meet throughout Q4 to develop themes and assumptions
  - Specialists from public markets, hedge funds and private markets provide insight on market themes
- Assumptions and Actions reviewed and approved by Partners Research Committee



#### Themes for 2013 Asset Class Assumptions

#### 5-7 year return expectations are broadly lower relative to prior year

- Sustained low yields keep bond market expectations historically low
- Rally in credit markets leads to meaningfully reduction in expectations for credit asset classes
- Risky asset fundamentals are similar, but strong 2012 performance limits further growth potential
  - US equity outperformance leads to lower expectations, non-US markets remain unchanged
- Liquid inflation sensitive asset classes have modest improvements in return and Sharpe ratio but forecasts are still low
- Hedge fund assumptions reduced based on lower expected cash returns and challenging alpha environment

## Volatility expectations reduced modestly in bond markets and certain equity markets

- Aligning volatility forecasts with evolution of market conditions
  - EM volatility falling modestly as growth continues
  - MBS markets reflecting government support

#### 30-year returns have similar themes to 5-7 year forecasts

- Reflecting pressure for higher long-term inflation through 25 basis point increase in long-term inflation forecast (3% for 5-7 years and 3.25% for 30 years)
- Broad based credit spread compression and low sovereign yields reduce long-term expectations for credit
- Limited changes to equity forecasts
- Remain higher than 5-7 year expectations



#### 2013 5-to-7 Year Return Forecasts

Geometric Expected Return							
Asset Class	2012	2013	2013-2012				
Cash	1.25%	0.75%	-0.50%				
Treasuries	1.50%	1.00%	-0.50%				
IG Corp Credit	4.50%	3.00%	-1.50%				
MBS	3.25%	2.50%	-0.75%				
Core Bonds*	2.88%	2.04%	-0.84%				
TIPS	1.75%	1.50%	-0.25%				
High-Yield Bonds	7.00%	5.00%	-2.00%				
Bank Loans	5.00%	5.00%					
Global Bonds (Unhedged)	1.25%	0.75%	-0.50%				
Global Bonds (Hedged)	1.49%	0.93%	-0.56%				
EMD External	5.75%	4.00%	-1.75%				
EMD Local Currency	6.75%	5.00%	-1.75%				
Large Cap Equities	7.25%	6.75%	-0.50%				
Small/Mid Cap Equities	7.50%	7.00%	-0.50%				
Int'l Equities (Unhedged)	7.75%	7.75%					
Int'l Equities (Hedged)	8.00%	8.00%					
Emerging Int'l Equities	9.75%	9.75%					
Private Equity	9.75%	9.00%	-0.75%				
Private Debt	9.50%	8.50%	-1.00%				
Private Real Assets	N/A	8.00%					
Real Estate	6.00%	6.00%					
Commodities	4.75%	5.00%	0.25%				
Non-US Credit	8.00%	10.00%	2.00%				
US Credit	6.00%	7.45%	1.45%				
Hedge Funds Low Vol	5.50%	4.75%	-0.75%				
Hedge Funds Mod Vol	7.25%	6.50%	-0.75%				

<sup>\*</sup>Core Bonds assumption based on market weighted blend of components of Aggregate Index (Treasuries, IG Corp Credit, and MBS).

<sup>\*\*</sup>US Credit assumption based on Client's actual weighting of Private Debt and Bank Loans.



#### 2013 5-to-7 Year Volatility Forecasts


	Volatility		
Asset Class	2012	2013	2013-2012
Cash	1.50%	1.00%	-0.50%
Treasuries	6.00%	6.00%	
IG Corp Credit	7.00%	7.50%	0.50%
MBS	9.00%	7.00%	-2.00%
Core Bonds *	7.00%	6.31%	-0.69%
TIPS	7.50%	7.50%	
High-Yield Bonds	13.00%	13.00%	
Bank Loans	6.50%	6.50%	
Global Bonds (Unhedged)	10.00%	9.00%	-1.00%
Global Bonds (Hedged)	5.50%	5.00%	-0.50%
EMD External	13.00%	12.00%	-1.00%
EMD Local Currency	15.00%	14.00%	-1.00%
Large Cap Equities	18.00%	18.00%	
Small/Mid Cap Equities	22.00%	21.00%	-1.00%
Int'l Equities (Unhedged)	21.00%	21.00%	
Int'l Equities (Hedged)	19.00%	19.00%	
Emerging Int'l Equities	27.00%	26.00%	-1.00%
Private Equity	28.00%	27.00%	-1.00%
Private Debt	19.00%	19.00%	
Private Real Assets	N/A	24.00%	
Real Estate	15.00%	17.00%	2.00%
Commodities	18.00%	18.00%	
Non-US Credit	9.00%	15.00%	6.00%
US Credit * *	7.0%	15.25%	8.25%
Hedge Funds Low Vol	7.00%	7.00%	
Hedge Funds Mod Vol	12.00%	12.00%	


<sup>\*</sup>Core Bonds assumption based on market weighted blend of components of Aggregate Index (Treasuries, IG Corp Credit, and MBS).



<sup>\*\*</sup>US Credit assumption based on Client's actual weighting of Private Debt and Bank Loans. In 2012, only the Bank Loans' volatility was used.


#### Summary of Changes to 2013 Return and Volatility Expectations









#### Relative Asset Class Attractiveness





#### Risk/Reward Comparison






#### Assumption Development – US Large Cap Equity

#### Sources of Return

- Valuation
- Real earnings growth
- Dividend yield
- Inflation

Return Source	Current Values	Expected Forecast Values	Return Contribution
Valuation (1 yr forward)	13.6	15	-0.25%
Real Growth*	2.7%	2.0%	2.0%
Dividend Yield	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%
Inflation	2.2%	3.0%	3.0%
		Total Expected Return	6.75%
* Real GDP growth used as proxy for			




Source: Ibbotson as of 11/30


#### Equity Risk Premium over 10 year Treasury is volatile

- Long-term average of 2.9%
- Our stock and bond forecasts imply an Equity Risk Premium of 5.75%
- While high relative to the long-term average, approximately 20% of observations over the last 40 years exceed this level
- Low interest rates and relatively attractive valuations are supportive of a high equity risk premium
  - Attractive valuations offset by potential for margin compression



#### US Large Cap Equity Building Blocks






Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30







Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30

Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30



#### Assumption Development – International Equities

#### Developed Markets

- Attractive valuation
  - Reflecting appropriate risk premium
  - Profit margins collapsed in 2012
- Higher dividend yields
- Continued uncertainty and elevated volatility
- Low growth and austerity but progress in Europe
- Recovery after several years of poor returns – but still lagging US markets
- 100 bps premium over US

Return Source	Current Values	Expected Forecast Values	Return Contribution
Valuation <i>(1 yr forward)</i>	13.2	13	0%
Real Growth*	1.9%	1.5%	1.5%
Dividend Yield	3.6%	3.0%	3.25%
Inflation	2.2%	3.0%	3.0%
		Total Expected Return	7.75%
* Real GDP growth used a			

#### Emerging Markets

- Attractive valuation
  - Profit margins collapsed in 2012
- Continued conviction in high growth prospects
- Strong absolute returns but behind US markets
- 300 bps premium over US
- 200 bps premium over Intl Developed


Return Source	Current Values	Expected Forecast Values	Return Contribution
Valuation (1 yr forward)	11.7	12	0%
Real Growth*	5.2%	3.5%	3.5%
Dividend Yield	4.1%	2.5%	3.25%
Inflation**	2.2%	3.0%	3.0%
		Total Expected Return	9.75%
* Real GDP growth used as pro			


\*\* - For assumption setting purposes, we thought of inflation as a global measure flowing through to investors and thus did not differentiate between expectations of low developed markets inflation and high emerging markets inflation

Source: Bloomberg, NEPC




#### International Developed Equity Building Blocks






Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as of 4/30









Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30

Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30



#### **Emerging Equity Building Blocks**






Source: IMF as of 10/30



MSCI EM Profit Margin (%)



8% 3.3% 7% Profit Margin 6% 5% 3% 2% Average 1% Profit Margin 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012


Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30

Source: Bloomberg as of 11/30



9%

#### Comparison of International Equity and US Large Cap Equity Expectations




- Expectations for Developed International Equities are relatively high compared to recent history
- Non-US markets have lagged the S&P 500 for several years and continued to lag in 2012
  - 5 year trailing performance as of December 31, 2012
    - S&P 500: 1.7%
    - MSCI EAFE: -3.7%
    - MSCI EM: -0.9%
- Valuations are fairly attractive and dividends are high
- Meaningful downside risks remain despite attractive valuations given exposure to any disappoint in Europe or long-term growth challenges in Japan
- While we expect investors to be compensated over 5-7 years with a higher relative return for holding non-US equities, it is appropriate to use active management to attempt to minimize exposure to downside risks



#### Starting Yields Signal Bond Returns

- Starting yield is the key building block for future performance
  - Correlation to forward return of 0.88
- Yields have had a 30-year secular decline
  - This has been a tailwind to performance
- Low current yields will challenge forward looking returns
  - 10 year Treasury Yield as of January 22, 2013 was 1.86%








#### Forecasting Bond Returns

Government/Credit Returns Over 6-Year Holding Periods (1972-2006) vs. Yield Matching Line




Source: Morgan Stanley Research, DataStream



#### Major Asset Class Review (Geometric)

	Historical Long Term Geometric	5-to-7 Year NEPC Assumptions							
Asset Class	Average <sup>1</sup>	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Cash	3.5%	3.75%	4.00%	4.00%	3.00%	2.00%	2.00%	1.25%	0.75%
Core Bonds <sup>2</sup>	8.2%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.50%	3.75%	3.00%	2.88%	2.03%
Large Cap	9.8%	8.50%	8.50%	8.50%	9.25%	7.75%	7.00%	7.25%	6.75%
International <sup>3</sup>	9.0%	9.00%	8.75%	9.00%	9.75%	8.00%	7.00%	7.75%	7.75%



- 1. Reflects average since inception (1926 except as noted below) of the respective index through 11/30/2012
- 2. LB/BC Aggregate reflects average compound annual return since 1976
- 3. International reflects average annual return since 1970



#### 2013 30-Year Return Forecasts

Geometri	c Expecte	ed Returi	n
Asset Class	2012	2013	2013-2012
Cash	3.25%	3.00%	-0.25%
Treasuries	3.50%	3.00%	-0.50%
Credit	5.00%	4.25%	-0.75%
MBS	5.25%	4.50%	-0.75%
Core Bonds*	4.50%	3.84%	-0.66%
TIPS	3.75%	3.25%	-0.50%
High-Yield Bonds	6.25%	5.25%	-1.00%
Bank Loans	6.00%	5.50%	-0.50%
Global Bonds (Unhedged)	3.25%	2.50%	-0.75%
Global Bonds (Hedged)	3.48%	2.67%	-0.81%
EMD External	6.25%	6.00%	-0.25%
EMD Local Currency	7.00%	6.25%	-0.75%
Large Cap Equities	8.00%	8.00%	
Small/Mid Cap Equities	8.50%	8.25%	-0.25%
Int'l Equities (Unhedged)	8.25%	8.25%	
Int'l Equities (Hedged)	8.50%	8.50%	
Emerging Int'l Equities	9.50%	9.50%	
Private Equity	10.00%	10.00%	
Private Debt	8.00%	8.00%	
Real Estate	6.00%	6.00%	
Commodities	5.25%	5.50%	0.25%
Hedge Funds Low Vol	6.25%	5.75%	-0.50%
Hedge Funds Mod Vol	8.00%	7.50%	-0.50%

<sup>\*</sup> Core Bonds assumption based on market weighted blend of components of Aggregate Index (Treasuries, IG Corp Credit, and MBS).



### California Public Plan Information



#### Development of Asset Class Assumptions

		Global Fixed				Absolute Return / Hedge Fund / GAA / Risk		
Plan name	Global Equity	Income	Real Assets	Real Estate	Private Equity	Parity	Cash	Other
AC Transit	48.0%	37.0%		5.0%_		10.0%		
ACERA Alameda County	59.0%	15.0%		6.0%_	7.5%	7.5%		5.0%
City of Fresno Retirement Systems Employee System	<u>55.0%</u>	24.0%		10.0%		11.0%		
City of Fresno Retirement Systems Fire & Police	55.0%	24.0%		10.0%		11.0%		
FPRS Administrator Pasadena	47.0%	35.0%			10.0%	5.0%	3.0%	
City of San Jose Federated	26.0%	15.0%	20.0%	5.0%	9.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
City of San Jose Police & Fire	29.0%	30.0%	10.0%	7.0%	8.0%	15.0%	1.0%	0.0%
Contra Costa County ERA	42.6%	29.4%	5.0%	12.5%	10.0%		0.5%	
EBMUD East Bay Municipal Utility District	70.0%	25.0%		5.0%				
FCERA Fresno County	<u>53.0%</u>	26.0%		6.0%		15.0%		
Imperial County Employees' Retirement System	55.0%	30.0%		5.0%		10.0%		
KCERA Kern County	45.0%	29.0%	6.0%	5.0%	5.0%	10.0%		
LACERA Los Angeles County	50.0%	24.0%	3.0%	10.0%	10.0%	1.0%	2.0%	
Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System	53.0%	24.0%	5.0%	5.0%	12.0%		1.0%	
Los Angeles Fire & Police Pension	50.0%	22.0%	5.0%	9.0%	9.0%	4.0%	1.0%	
MCERA Marin County	54.0%	23.0%		15.0%_	8.0%_			
MCERA Mendocino County	63.0%	28.0%		9.0%				
SamCERA San Mateo County	53.0%	22.0%	3.0%	5.0%	8.0%_	9.0%		
SBCERS Santa Barbara County	43.0%	30.0%	12.0%	8.0%	7.0%			
SCERA Sonoma County	57.0%	20.0%	5.0%	10.0%		8.0%		
SCERS Sacramento County	50.0%	20.0%	15.0%		5.0%	10.0%		
SDCERA San Diego City	58.5%	27.0%		11.0%	3.5%			
SJCERA San Joaquin County	34.0%	20.0%	7.0%	10.0%		14.0%		15.0%
SLOCPT San Luis Obispo County	50.0%	30.0%	5.0%	10.0%	5.0%			
StanCERA Stanislaus County	60.9%	37.6%		1.5%				
VCERA Ventura County	54.0%	24.0%		7.0%	5.0%	7.0%		3.0%
Average	50.6%	25.8%	3.9%	7.2%	4.7%	6.6%	0.3%	0.9%
Median	53.0%	24.5%	1.5%	7.0%	5.0%	7.3%	0.0%	0.0%

Source: San Jose Retirement Services.



#### California Public Plan Info

Plan name	Total plan assets (\$bns)	Funded ratio (a)	Assumed rate of return, real (a)	Assumed rate of return, nominal (a)	Inflation estimate	Most recent Actuarial Valuation date	Preliminary fiscal 2013 performance (b)
AC Transit	0.5	63.9%	4.38%	7.38%	3.00%	01/01/13	13.8%
ACERA Alameda County	5.7	73.9%	4.30%	7.80%	3.50%	12/31/12	15.5%
City of Fresno Retirement Systems Employee System	1.1	102.2%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	13.6%
City of Fresno Retirement Systems Fire & Police	1.2	105.6%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	13.6%
City of Pasadena Fire & Police	0.1	78.1%	3.00%	6.00%	3.25%	06/30/12	12.5%
City of San Jose Federated		62.0%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	8.0%
City of San Jose Police & Fire	2.9	78.8%	3.75%	7.25%	3.50%	06/30/12	9.7%
Contra Costa County ERA	5.9	70.6%	4.00%	7.25%	3.25%	12 <u>/</u> 31/12	12.5%
EBMUD East Bay Municipal Utility District	1_1	65.0%	3.25%	7.75%	4.50%	03/30/12	not available
FCERA Fresno County	3.5	76.2%	3.25%	7. <u>7</u> 5%	4.50%	06/30/12	not available
Imperial County Employees' Retirement System	0.6	89.9%	4.25%	7.75%	3.50%	06/30/12	12.2%
KCERA Kern County	3.4	61.0%	4.50%	7.75%	3.25%	06/30/12	10.6%
LACERA Los Angeles County	41.0	76.8%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	12.1% <u>(</u> c)
LACERS Los Angeles City	11.9_	69.4%	5.22%	7.75%	2.53%	06/30/12	14.1%
Los Angeles Fire & Police Pension	16.7	77.7%	4.25%	7.75%	3.50%	06/30/12	12.7%
MCERA Marin County	1.7_	71.3%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	14.5%
MCERA Mendocino County	0.3	74.1%	4.25%	7.75%	3.50%	06/30/12	11.5%
SamCERA San Mateo County	2.7	72.0%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	13.5%
SBCERS Santa Barbara County	2.2	71.2%	4.50%	7.75%	3.25%	06/30/12	7.9%
SCERA Sonoma County	2.0	77.9%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	12/31/12	15.7%(c)
SCERS Sacramento County	6.9	83.3%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%	06/30/12	13.2%
SDCERA San Diego City	6.0	68.6%	3.75%	7.50%	3.75%	06/30/12	13.6%
SJCERA San Joaquin County	2.2	70.0%	5.70%	7.75%	2.05%	01/01/12	8.9%
SLOCPT San Luis Obispo County	1.1	76.4%	4.50%	7.30%	2.80%	01/01/13	12.8%
StanCERA Stanislaus County	1.5	76.0%	4.50%	7.75%	3.25%	06/30/12	14.6%
VCERA Ventura County	3.6	77.7%	4.50%	7.75%	3.25%	06/30/12	12.8%
Average	4.9	75.8%	4.22%	7.53%	3.31%		12.4%
Median	2.2	75.1%	4.25%	7.50%	3.25%		12.8%

<sup>(</sup>a) For the most recent Actuarial Valuation.

Source: San Jose Retirement Services.



<sup>(</sup>b) Net return unless otherwise noted. For the period July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013.

<sup>(</sup>c) Gross of fees return; all others net of fees.

## Initial Thoughts on Onboarding Process



#### 2013 Draft Work Plan

Board Meeting	Agenda Item
October 21, 2013	✓ NEPC to attend as Observer
	✓ NEPC/Staff to Discuss Plan Background
	✓ Work plan discussion/review with Staff
	✓ Manager Presentations
	✓ Investment Consultant contract for Nov 1
	✓ Manager Guideline Review and Risk  Modeling Profile
	✓ Annual Proxy Voting Report (by HEK)
	✓ SSgA Securities Lending Agreement
	Ammendment for the acceptance of Non-
	cash collateral. (presented by staff with
	input by HEK)
November 18, 2013	✓ Third quarter investment performance
	✓ October monthly performance
	✓ Last HEK Board meeting and performance reports
	✓ Review of board "risk profile" poll
	✓ Set Board Meeting Dates and Investment
	Manager Presentations
	✓ Review Due Diligence Calendar
December 16, 2013	√ 2014 work plan discussion
	✓ VCERA Investment Program Review



# Initial Thoughts on Plan



#### Asset Allocation Comparison

	Client 1*	Client 2	Client 3	Client 4	Client 5	Client 6	Client 7	VCERA
U.S. Equity	30	13	33	15	18	28	25	30
Non-U.S. Equity	30	13	23	17	14	20	15	14
Global Equity	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	10
Total Equity	60	26	56	36	32	48	40	54
Domestic Fixed Income	25	3	18	13	8	22	18	19.2
Credit/Private Debt	-	22	3	7	12	10	15	-
High Yield	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	_
Global Bonds	-	2	_	3	1	_	_	4.8
Emerging Market Debt	_	6	4	3	3	5	2	-
TIPS	_	-	-	-	-	-	_	_
Total Fixed Income	30	33	25	26	24	37	35	24
Real Estate	6	9	8	10	10	5	2	7
REITs	4	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
Private Equity	-	16	7	5	9	-	5	5
Absolute Return	-	7	-	7	4	-	8	-
Total Alternatives	10	32	15	22	23	5	18	12
GTAA/Risk Parity				6	12	10	5	7
Real Assets/Commodities	<u>-</u>	7	4	10	7	-	1	3
Cash		2	4	10	2	-	1	3
Total Other	0	9	4	16	21	10	7	10
	-	-	-					
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
As of March 31, 2013:								
Total Assets (\$ Millions)	2,235	6,946	30,185	10,524	7,200	500	10,212	3,500
Total Fishers (# Willions)	2,200	0,740	00,700	10,024	7,200	555	10,212	3,300
5 Year - Total Fund Return	5.3%	3.1%	5.7%	4.7%	3.1%	5.5%	5.6%	]
5 Year - Benchmark Return	5.4%	4.7%	5.2%	4.5%	3.0%	5.3%	4.2%	

<sup>\*</sup>Became NEPC Client in 1Q 2013



#### Allocations Analyzed – Ventura County

Asset Class	Current Allocation	60/40 Mix	Proposed Mix
U.S. Equities	30%	35%	25%
Int'l Equities	14%	25%	10%
Global Equities	10%	-	10%
Total Equity	54%	60%	45%
Core Bonds	19.2%	28%	10%
Global Fixed Income	4.8%	2%	-
Credit/Private Debt	-	-	7%
Emerging Market Debt	-	2%	3%
Total Fixed Income	24%	32%	20%
Real Estate	7%	8%	8%
Private Equity	5%	-	8%
GTAA/Risk Parity	7%	-	9%
Real Assets/MLP's	3%	-	10%
<b>Total Alternatives</b>	22%	8%	35%

Expected Return 5-7 Year	6.6%	6.2%	7.2%
Expected Return 30 Year	7.6%	7.2%	8.1%
Standard Dev of Asset Return	12.6%	12.1%	12.8%
Probability of 5-Year Return Over 7.75%	42.1%	38.4%	46.1%
Sortino Ratio MAR @ 0%	0.65	0.62	0.68
Sharpe Ratio	0.47	0.45	0.50

- New allocation clearly step in the right direction
- Sample potential allocation seeks to diversify risk while seeking a higher return
- Reduce low yielding core bond and global bond allocations to introduce dedicated EMD, Opportunistic Credit and Private Debt exposures
- Reduce equity exposure and increase exposure to tactical strategies (GAA/Risk Parity)
- Private Equity will require significant time to build-out



#### **Information Disclaimer**

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